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Abstract 
This thesis examines how Judaism was Hellenized by comparing how difference, boundaries, 
and syncretism function in both Philo and 4 Maccabees. Recent historical and 
anthropological methods demand rejection of old approaches to these works which 
differentiated between the Judaism and the Hellenism in them and were often dominated by 
attempts to show where these authors’ intellectual fidelities lay. By re-evaluating ideas of 
boundaries and identity, this thesis argues that these authors could be committed to the ends 
of both Judaism and Hellenism. This necessitates recognition that identity and boundaries are 
ultimately products of individual self-consciousness; these authors attempt to understand the 
world around them using multifarious resources. While the Torah is vitally important to the 
Jewish identity of both these authors, it becomes a symbol which transcends perceived 
boundaries between Judaism and Hellenism and becomes applicable to both paradigms.  
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction and Literature Review 
1.1 Introduction  
Though the Hellenization of Judaism was ubiquitous in the Graeco-Roman world, the 
question of what Hellenistic Judaism was is far from settled.
1
 Sometimes used as a catch 
all title, or subdivided by various geographical locations or cities as though each one 
presented a homogenized center of Judaic thought, the reality is that Hellenistic Jewish 
theology and philosophy does not present a fixed position at any point in time but rather 
many evolving discourses.  
                                                 
1 There are ongoing discussions of whether the term “Judaism” is accurate and/or legitimate. Shaye Cohen 
traced the emergence of “Judaism” as an “ethno-religion” in The Beginnings of Jewishness: Boundaries, 
Varieties, Uncertainties (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 109-138. Daniel Boyarin argues 
that the mutual emergence of Judaism and Christianity in Late Antiquity defined both in Border Lines: The 
Partition of Judeo-Christianity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). The term “Judaism” 
is further problematized by Seth Schwartz, as is the term “religion.” He argues that it was not until the 
branding of  “Judaism” as a religion and its interaction with Christianity (300-400 C.E.) that Jews turned 
inward and became pronounced religious communities in Imperialism and Jewish Society 200 B.C.E. to 
640 C.E. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 198. Daniel Schwartz, examines the problem of 
translation into English terms in “‘Judean’ or ‘Jew’: How should we translate Ioudaios in Josephus?” in 
Jewish Identity in the Greco-Roman World, ed. Jörg Frey, Daniel R. Schwartz, and Stephanie Gripentrog 
(Leiden: Brill, 2007), 3-29. In his article, “Jews, Judeans, Judaizing, Judaism: Problems of Categorization 
in Ancient History,” JSJ 38 no. 4-5 (2007): 457-512, Steve Mason critiques the use of “Judaism” as a 
religious category by historians, arguing that such categories are based on an anachronistic use of the 
concept of religion. He proposes that up to the 3
rd
 C C.E. the designators “Jew” and “Judean” were 
primarily ethnic and geographic. On the question of “Judaism” and “Hellenism,” Wayne Meeks argues that 
the use of these concepts create a hermeneutic power dynamic that seeks to label ancient authors as one or 
the other in “Paul and the Judaism/Hellenism Dichotomy: Toward a Social History of the Question,” in 
Paul Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide, ed. Troels Engberg-Pedersen (Louisville: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 2001), 17-28. For the similar issue of problematization of the terms “Hellenism” and 
“Hellenization,” see Philip S. Alexander, “Hellenism and Hellenization as Problematic Historiographical 
Categories,” in Engberg-Pedersen ed., 63-80. Alexander says that Hellenism is a modern ideological 
construct, “a highly charged and value-laden concept in the discourse of post-Enlightement European 
thought” (67).  Despite their problematic nature, this study uses the designators “Jew” and “Judaism” to 
describe both the ethnicity and the religious positions of Philo and 4 Maccabees because of the 
historiographical necessity for categorization. In addition, “Hellenism” and “Hellenization” will be used to 
designate the cultural context(s) in which Philo and the author of 4 Maccabees were constructing identity. 
2 
 
Two authors who have been seen, among many others, to embody the formation of 
Jewish identity in the Diaspora are Philo Judaeus and the unknown writer of 4 
Maccabees.
2
 These two works are similar in many ways. They both appeal to the four 
Stoic virtues, both try to connect Greek concepts of virtue to Jewish life and practice, and 
both proclaim the importance of the Jewish law to philosophy and ethical living. Both 
works also present Jewish history as containing the answer to two significant problems 
with which Hellenistic philosophy was grappling, namely, the failure to produce moral 
perfection in its followers and the inability of reason to eradicate the passions.  
Two theories about Jews and Hellenization which dominated past approaches to these 
works will be challenged and expanded on in this study. The first is that Jews and 
Hellenism were fundamentally at odds. In the past this resulted in multiple studies which 
claimed that these authors were fully committed to either Torah supremacy or Hellenistic 
philosophy and used the other insincerely. With new approaches to the study of 
Hellenization, this assumption has been challenged, yet the literature review below will 
show that recent studies of Philo and 4 Maccabees have utilized fresh approaches such as 
gender studies and post-colonialism without adequately correcting this assumption or 
expanding on the complicated issue of identity using anthropological theory. This study 
                                                 
2
 All quotations from Philo are taken from T. E. Page et al., eds., Philo, trans. F. H. Colson and G. H. 
Whitaker, 11 vols. (LCL; Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1929-1962); quotations from 4 
Maccabees are taken from Albert Pietersma and Benjamin G. Wright, eds., A New English Translation of 
the Septuagint (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Greek text taken from Alfred Rahlfs and 
Robert Hanhart, eds., Septuaginta, 2 vols. (ed. alt.; Stuttgart, Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2006); all 
abbreviations are taken from Patrick H. Alexander et al., The SBL Handbook of Style: For Ancient Near 
Eastern, Biblical and Early Christian Studies (Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 1999); translations of 
classical fragments are from L. Edelstein and I. G. Kidd eds., Posidonius, 4 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1972-1999) and A.A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophers: Translation of the Principle 
Sources with Philosophical Commentary, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), unless 
otherwise noted. 
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will approach both works as products of authors who believe that Judaism as a 
philosophy can and must answer, not only the philosophical problems of Judaism, but 
Hellenism as well. This challenge will be referred to throughout this paper as a crisis of 
applicability. 
The second theory which is prevalent in studies of Jewish history is that the Torah was 
fundamental to Jewish identity in the Diaspora. This study will not contest this but will 
suggest that, for both Philo and 4 Maccabees, Torah functioned on a symbolic level in 
addition to other ways such as textual and behavioural. In Philo’s work, Torah is a 
corporeal manifestation of the unwritten or natural law of God, and in 4 Maccabees, it 
carries the universal significance and ethical demands of an ancestral law. For both of 
these authors, the Torah becomes the bridge between Jewish and Hellenistic philosophy. 
This shows that some conceptions of boundaries between Judaism and Hellenism are 
over-simplistic; Torah becomes the justification for Hellenization. Torah legitimates the 
philosophical discussions of both works; however, its symbolic meaning is flexible 
enough to allow differing philosophies as well as local forms of patriotism. 
Consequently, both authors have unique and disparate interactions with similar 
Hellenistic ideas. Both present relatively different approaches to the same basic problems 
in Hellenistic philosophy based on distinct understandings of the Torah and the Jews’ 
place in the world; however, both works are driven by Hellenistic concerns.  
So, the purpose of this study will be to draw conclusions about first century Diaspora 
Hellenization from a comparison of these two works. These are not necessarily true for 
all Diaspora Jews but, nevertheless, the conclusions drawn here may lead to a better 
understanding of the way that they interacted with Greek culture and philosophy.  Since 
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this study will be a comparison, the shorter work of 4 Maccabees will dictate the issues 
presented. For both works, Torah operates as a symbol which gives the authors a sense of 
identity but is not so restrictive that they cannot use it to justify and clarify Hellenistic 
ends. Furthermore, both works show that Diaspora Judaisms could not be inward 
focused. The rise of Hellenism and the abstraction that accompanied it created the need 
for overarching systems which could not only identify the place of Judaism in the world 
but also the place of Hellenism. Hellenism provides the framework for Jewish self-
perception and is, ironically, used to justify both Jewish inclusivism and exceptionalism. 
Finally, the realities of life in the Graeco-Roman poleis are clear in Philo and seem to be 
present in 4 Maccabees as well, specifically, that Jews were in danger of being relegated 
to a lower social class. This means that both of these works attempt to justify Jewish 
philosophy/theology as a serious philosophical force which produced Hellenistic ethics 
better than Greek philosophy could. Consequently, even in attempting to display Jewish 
thought, they are governed by a Hellenistic framework and both end up arguing that Jews 
make better Hellenes.  
1.2 Synopsis 
Although the issues will be summarized briefly here, it is necessary to provide some 
background to both 4 Maccabees and Philo. The beginning of critical approaches to 4 
Maccabees can be attributed to Erasmus, who focused on the issue of martyrdom in 
relation to the upheavals of the Reformation.
3
 Among nineteenth century scholars it 
                                                 
3
 Flavius Josephus, Opera Iosephi interprete Ruffino presbytero, De Insigni Machabaeorum martyrio… 
catigatus ab Erasmo Roterodamo, ed. Desiderius Erasmus (1524), as read in R. B. Townshend, “The 
Fourth Book of Maccabees,” in The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament in English, ed. 
R. H. Charles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913), 2:661.  
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garnered increased attention as a text which represented “a great advance… in the 
application of Platonic wisdom and Greek rhetoric.”4 Increasing interest in biblical 
manuscripts, as well as Constantin von Tischendorf’s discovery of Codex Siniaticus, led 
to text critical study of the work. 4 Maccabees is witnessed in Codex Siniaticus (fourth 
century C.E.), Codex Alexandrinus (fifth century C.E.), and partially (omitting 5:11-12:1) 
in Codex Venetus (ninth century C.E.); it is notably absent from Codex Vaticanus (fifth 
century C.E.).
5
 It is also witnessed in the Syriac Peshitta under the title: The Fourth Book 
of Maccabees and their Mother, where it seems to be reliant on Codex Siniaticus.
6
 
Early scholars debated the question of authorship and the belief that Josephus penned 4 
Maccabees (Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 3.10) was almost unanimously discarded because of the 
absence of stylistic elements of Josephus’ works.7 The question of geographic origin also 
dominated the nineteenth and early twentieth century and Alexandrian provenance was 
frequently proposed because of the author’s Hellenizing tendencies and obvious Diaspora 
roots.
8
 However, Jakob Freudenthal suggested that the linguistic use fit much better in 
                                                 
4
 H. Ewald, Geschichte des Volkes Israel (Göttingen: in der Dieterichschen Buchhandlung,1864), trans. J.E. 
Carpenter as The History of Israel (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1880), 5:484-485.  
5
 H. Anderson, “4. Maccabees,” in The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, ed. James Charlesworth (Garden 
City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1985), 2:531; Leonhard Rost, Judaism Outside the Hebrew Canon: An 
Introduction to the Documents, trans. David E. Green (Nashville: Abingdon, 1971), 107; Moses Hadas, The 
Third and Fourth Books of Maccabees (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), 135. 
6
 Anderson, “4. Maccabees,” 2:532. Rahlfs, ed., Septuaginta, relies on A while providing text critical notes 
from א and V.  For early critical editions see O. F. Frizsche, ed., Libri Apocryphi Veteris Testamenti Graeci 
(Leipzig, 1871); H. B. Swete, The Old Testament in Greek according to the Septuagint, 3 vols. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1896-1905).  
7
 To my knowledge David S. Williams is the only modern scholar who has argued for Josephan authorship 
in Stylometric Authorship Studies in Flavius Josephus and Related Literature (Lewiston: E. Mellen Press, 
1992).  
8
 H. B. Swete, Introduction to the Old Testament in Greek (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1900), 
280-281; C.W. Emmet, The Fourth Book of Maccabees (London: Society for Promoting Christian 
Knowledge, 1918), xxiii. 
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Asia Minor.
9
 Jan Willem van Henten recently echoed this argument for an Asia Minor 
provenance saying that, in comparison to 2 Maccabees, 4 Maccabees shows a shift 
toward interest in Seleucid rulers.
10
 This argument is unconvincing since, at the time of 
writing, the Seleucids were primarily remembered in written sources or cultural memory. 
Furthermore, as Chapter Four will suggest, it was in the interests of someone presenting 
Jewish belief as a superior philosophical system to downplay the factionalism among 
Jews which is presented in 2 Maccabees. Van Henten’s argument is more convincing 
when he argues that the inscriptions from Asia Minor match the funerary epitaph style of 
4 Maccabees.
11
  
The broad identification of Asia Minor led to the narrow argument for the work 
originating in the Jewish community at Antioch.
12
 Perhaps the best case for Antiochian 
origin is made by H. Anderson, who suggests that Jerome knew of a cult of Maccabean 
martyrs there. The work may be in veneration of an Antiochian martyrs’ shrine, and the 
author speaks of a special occasion which the work is celebrating (4 Macc 3:19).
13
 
Finally, the word ἀντίψυχος is only elsewhere used in Ignatius (Eph. 21; Smyrn. 10; Poly. 
2, 6), Cassius Dio Cocceianus (Hist. Rom. 59.8), and Lucian of Samosata (Lex. 10), 
which might be evidence of an Asia Minor or Antiochian provenance by geographical 
proximity. 
                                                 
9
 J. Freudenthal, Die Flavius Josephus beigelegte Schrift Ueber die Herrschaft der Vernunft (IV 
Makkabäerbuch) (Breslau: Schlettersche Buchhandlung, 1869), 112.  
10
 Jan Willem van Henten, The Maccabean Martyrs as Saviours of the Jewish People (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 
80. 
11
 van Henten, The Maccabean Martyrs, 80. 
12
 Hadas, The Third and Fourth Books, 110. Hadas builds on arguments made by Cardinal Rampolla de 
Tindaro in “Martyre et Sépulture des Machabées,” Revue de l’art Chretien 42 (1899): 377-392. 
13
 Anderson, “4 Maccabees,” 2:535. 
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Further research into the possibility of 4 Maccabees being composed in Rhodes might 
prove beneficial because of the potential influence of Posidonius of Rhodes, which will 
be examined in Chapter Five. Nevertheless, though discussion of origins is certainly 
important, a century of these arguments has proven inconclusive. This study will focus 
instead on the clearly demonstrable fact that Philo and 4 Maccabees are responding to 
very similar ideological challenges of Hellenism, whether or not they were composed in 
the same location.  
There are several elements of 4 Maccabees which enable a rough dating of the text. It 
cannot be dated with certainty earlier than the Common Era, since the jurisdictional 
connection between Syria, Cilicia, and Phoenicia, which the text mentions (4 Macc 4:2) 
did not happen until the reorganization of these provinces by the Julio-Claudian emperors 
(18 – 55 C.E.).14  Attempts to date the text have also focused on the portrayal of the 
Jerusalem temple, but this argument is unconvincing. R. B. Townshend argued that the 
work was pre-70 C.E. based on several apparent references to the temple and suggested 
that 4 Maccabees was composed between 63 B.C.E. and 68 C.E.
15
 Both Elias 
Bickermann and Moses Hadas echoed this, but many scholars have suggested that the 
references to the temple which they cite are unconvincing (4 Macc 4:20, 14:9).
16
 Urs 
Breitenstein, for example, argued that 2 Maccabees was the source for 4
 
Maccabees and 
that it was penned after the destruction of the temple because the author removed most 
                                                 
14
David deSilva, 4 Maccabees (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), 14; E. J. Bickermann, Studies 
in Jewish and Christian History (Leiden: Brill, 1976), 1:278. 
15
 R. B. Townshend, “The Fourth Book of Maccabees,” in The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old 
Testament in English, ed. R.H. Charles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913), 2:653-685. 
16
 Bickermann, Studies in Jewish and Christian History, 1:277; Hadas, The Third and Fourth Books, 95; 
J.J. Collins suggests that these references are unconvincing in Between Athens and Jerusalem: Jewish 
Identity in the Hellenistic Diaspora, 2
nd
 ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 203.  
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references to the temple from 2 Maccabees.
17
 So, there is not enough evidence in the text 
to clearly support whether it was written before or after the fall of the temple, especially 
since a lack of interest in the temple cult should not be surprising for a work written in 
the Diaspora.
18
  
Linguistic and philological efforts to date the work have been the most successful. Elias 
Bickermann, for example, traced the replacement of the term νομικός with γραμματεύς (2 
Macc 6:18; 4 Macc 5:4).
19
 He also noted that the word for religion (θρησκεία) was only 
used from the time of Augustus on.
20
 Ultimately, there is general consensus that the text 
was produced in the first century or the early second century C.E.  
One of the most unique linguistic characteristics of 4 Maccabees is its Atticizing style, 
which employs frequent use of the optative mood.
21
 Furthermore, Bickermann says that it 
is written in the “choicest ‘Asianic’ Greek” of the period, following Eduard Norden who 
divided the work into two parts, the first of which is “simple and essential,” and the 
second of which contains a frantic description of the torture which is dressed up with the 
highest rhetoric.
22
  
                                                 
17
Urs Breitenstein, Beobachtungen zu Sprache, Stil und Gedankengut des Vierten Makkabäerbuchs (Basel 
and Stuttgart: Schwabe, 1976),171-174, as read in Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem, 203; Emil 
Schürer, The Literature of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus (New York: Schocken Books, 1972), 
246; deSilva, 4 Maccabees,14.   
18
 Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem, 203. 
19
 Bickermann, Studies in Jewish and Christian History, 1:276-77. Hadas, The Third and Fourth Books, 95.  
20
 Bickermann, Studies in Jewish and Christian History, 1:277. 
21
 Henry S. T. John Thackeray, A Grammar of the Old Testament in Greek according to the Septuagint 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1909), 24, 193. 
22
 Bickermann, Studies in Jewish and Christian History, 1: 277; E. Norden, Die Antike Künstprosa vom VI. 
Jahrhundert v. Chr. bis in die Zeit der Rennaissance (Leipzig: Teubner, 1898), 418-419 (“...sind von  
geradezu rasender Leidenschaftlichkeit, aufgeputzt mit allen Mitteln der höchsten Rhetorik, die er mit 
grosser Geschicklichkeit handhabt”); on Greek rhetoric in the work see Freudenthal, Die Flavius Josephus, 
19. 
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Emil Schürer calls the genre of 4 Maccabees either discourse or a sermon. Despite this, 
Schürer and others have rejected the proposition that 4 Maccabees is an example of 
synagogue preaching because of the lack of reference to any scripture in the opening.
23
 
According to James Davila, the intended audience is certainly Jews. He identifies this 
through the use of the first person plural: “the implied author and the implied audience 
are Torah observant and of Jewish ethnic origin.”24 Furthermore, they are Jews who are 
aware of the choice which they faced between following the Torah or compromising in 
order to receive a better standing in a Graeco-Roman society.
25
 This study will ultimately 
propose that people in any Hellenized Diaspora settlement could be the intended audience 
of the text, but the advanced language and philosophical nuances of the work are unlikely 
to be grasped by anyone without extensive education.  
Since less mystery surrounds the figure of Philo of Alexandria, some biographical 
information will suffice here. The historical figure of Philo of Alexandria was from a 
wealthy family, and his lack of financial constraints meant that he could focus on a deep 
study of both the Hebrew Bible/Septuagint and Greek philosophy.
26
 It is uncertain 
whether or not he knew Hebrew and/or Syriac, as Ferdinand Delaunay suggested over a 
century ago.
27
 Philo is only referenced elsewhere in the primary sources by Josephus, 
who called him the brother of Alexander the Alabarch:  
                                                 
23
 Schürer, Literature of the Jewish People, 244; Anderson, “4. Maccabees,” 2:535. 
24
 James R. Davila, The Provenance of the Pseudepigrapha: Jewish, Christian or Other? (Leiden: Brill, 
2005), 147.  
25David deSilva, “The Noble Contest: Honor, Shame, and the Rhetorical Strategy of 4 Maccabees,” JSP 7 
no. 13 (April, 1995): 53.  
26
Adolf Hausrath, Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte: Die Zeit der Apostel, 2
nd
 ed. (Heidelberg: 
Bassermann, 1875), 1:147.  
27
 Ferdinand Delaunay, Philon D’Alexandrie, Ecrits Historiques: Influence, Luttes et Persecutions des 
Juifs, 2
nd 
ed. (Paris: Librairie Acadèmique, 1870), 15-16. 
10 
 
But Philo, the principal of the Jewish embassage, a man eminent on all accounts, 
brother to Alexander the Alabarch, and one not unskillful in philosophy, was 
ready to betake himself to make his defense against those accusations; but Caius 
prohibited him, and bid him begone; he was also in such a rage, that it openly 
appeared he was about to do them some very great mischief. So Philo being thus 
affronted, went out, and said to those Jews who were about him, that they should 
be of good courage, since Caius’s words indeed showed anger at them, but in 
reality had already set God against himself. (Ant. 18.1)
28
 
It is also known from his own writings that he went to the embassy of Caligula to petition 
him about plight of the Jews in Alexandria in 40 C.E. (Legatio ad Gaium).
29
 In the 20
th
 
and 21
st
 Century he has been considered a key figure in both Middle Platonism and the 
birth of Neo-Platonism. 
1.3 Literature Review 
1.3.1 Hellenization and Judaism 
As stated in the introduction, theories of Hellenization have evolved in the last century to 
challenge the thesis that Judaism and Hellenism were always diametrically opposed to 
one another, as well as the assumption that there were always clear distinctions between 
the two. A short review of this progression is provided here, but Lester Grabbe (2008) 
has written a more extensive survey of the literature on this topic than this work can 
provide. This section will use Grabbe’s overview as a basic framework, referring to other 
works where necessary.
30
  The other challenge is that it cannot simply be assumed that 
the Hellenization of Judaism was the same in the Diaspora and in Palestine but, since not 
all works make this distinction, they must be discussed as a group. W. W. Tarn (1927) 
represents a type of early view of Hellenization which is based on the assumption that the 
                                                 
28
 William Whiston, tr., The New Complete Works of Josephus (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 1999).   
29
 Schürer, Literature of the Jewish People, 323.  
30
 Lester Grabbe, A History of the Jews and Judaism in the Second Temple Period, vol. 2, The Coming of 
the Greeks: The Early Hellenistic Period (335-175 BCE) (London: T & T Clark, 2008), 125-136. 
11 
 
extant texts represent the historical realities of Judaism. In this approach, Jews were 
thought to have challenged Hellenization because of their strong faith and refusal to 
compromise.
31
 Elias Bickermann (1947; 1949; 1962) expanded on this theory by arguing 
that the Jews had a unique encounter with Hellenization because of the triumph of the 
Maccabees which, he says, gave the Jews the power to accept some Hellenistic cultural 
influences but to keep the Torah central.
32
 The appeal of Bickermann’s approach was his 
avoidance of the issue of, as Martha Himmelfarb says, “how much is Jewish and how 
much is Greek in a particular text;” he focused instead on what the reception of 
Hellenism by Jews looked like.
33
 Victor Tcherikover (1959) accepted Bickermann’s 
theory, but divided the responses to Hellenization according to social class. He suggested 
that it was the upper class of Jews who adopted Hellenistic ways, juxtaposed against the 
majority of the regular people who kept faithful. He furthermore applied this analysis to 
the Diaspora, saying that because the Jews offended the Gentiles around them by not 
accepting their gods and not associating with them, they were consequently forced to 
remain in a lower class.
34
 Martin Hengel (1974) also built on Bickermann’s thesis, but he 
began with the assertion that Jews were universally Hellenized. This meant that there was 
a fraction of the Jewish population which embodied Bickermann’s model of resistance to 
Hellenism, while most others embraced it like Tcherikover says, but that it is virtually 
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impossible to identify which groups were which since all Jews eventually succumbed to 
the process.
35
 Arnaldo Momigliano (1975) rejected Hengel’s view and, ultimately, 
Bickermann’s on the basis of a lack of evidence for the way that Hellenization in 
Palestine functioned. Perhaps his greatest contribution to the study of Hellenization has 
been to reverse the direction of impact, and examine the effect which the Jews (and 
others) had on the Hellenes.
36
 This led to a study by Louis Feldman (1977), in which he 
suggested that not all Jews were Hellenized. Feldman has been frequently criticized, 
however, for his underlying assumption that Judaism which Hellenized was not true 
Judaism, therefore his article is a rather visceral response to Hengel’s claims that 
Stoicism and Platonism influenced Judaism, especially the Rabbinic movement.
37
  
What these works ultimately highlighted was the complexity of the relationship between 
Jews and Hellenes, and two excellent studies by Erich Gruen (1998; 2002) have shown 
this and will frame the approach of this study to Philo and 4 Maccabees. In Heritage and 
Hellenism, he dismisses the claim that Judaism and Hellenism were at odds with one 
another either in the Diaspora or Palestine, arguing instead that Hellenism was widely 
accepted and desired by many Jews. This work also rebutted Bickermann’s theory that 
the Hasmonean dynasty (140-37 B.C.E.) represented the defeat of Hellenization in 
Palestine, and he shows how extensively Hellenized the Hasmonean leaders were.
38
 In 
Diaspora: Jews amidst Greeks and Romans, he makes the case that the presence of Torah 
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was a consistent boundary marker for the Jews, but he also argues that Jewishness and 
Hellenism were not necessarily seen to be in conflict with one another. Ancient authors, 
including Josephus and 4 Maccabees, wrote about Torah observance in an ironic way to 
highlight the Jews’ consistency and the Greeks’ inconsistency towards their own 
philosophy. As Gruen says, “ethics, not ethnics, matter.”39 So, “the Hellenic medium thus 
served to convey Jewish commitment to Torah in contrast with the irrationality and 
atrocities of the Greeks themselves.”40  
Two scholars have recently reiterated the idea that Jews had a unique and measured 
contact with Hellenism. Martha Himmelfarb (2005) has defended the legitimacy of 
Bickermann’s argument and suggests that the Jews were able to have the unique contact 
with Hellenism that they did precisely because of the Torah: it remained the cultural point 
of reference in contact with the outside world. She furthermore says that Philo (and 
Josephus) “(adapted) Greek ideas and values in the service of a new understanding of 
Jewish tradition, which is, none the less, distinctively Jewish.”41 This has been echoed in 
a recent study by Louis Feldman (2006). 
The question of Greek influence on the Jews in Palestine is to be viewed in the 
way the Greek language and traditions were adopted into their own native and 
distinctive time-honored background… The question thus becomes how did the 
Jews manage to maintain their indigenous character and unique self-definition and 
time-honored culture and values while adapting to contact with the Greek 
language and culture? 
42
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He extends this approach to the Diaspora, citing synagogue evidence to claim that 
Diaspora Judaism was even more aware of the danger which Hellenization presented, and 
therefore was more zealous.
43
  
1.3.2 Jewish Identity in the Diaspora 
The last decade has seen a renewed focus on the difficult issue of Jewish identity. These 
works have both elucidated and complicated the understanding of Diaspora issues. 
Graham Harvey (1998) examines the title “Hebrew” which is used in 4 Maccabees as 
well as other Pseudepigrapha; he argues that it was often an indicator of religious 
faithfulness rather than simply an ethnic designator.
44
 In fact, recent studies have 
challenged the idea of clear-cut cultural boundaries between Jews and Hellenes as literary 
constructions; the lived realities of Jews, especially in Diaspora, were likely more 
complicated. Martha Himmelfarb (1998) suggests this, and she argues that 2 Maccabees 
was the first work to display awareness of cultural boundaries between Hellenism and 
Judaism.
45
 Shaye Cohen (1999) echoes this, and he attributes the emergence of this 
dichotomy to Rabbinic Jews. He argues that, in fact, there were very few identity markers 
for Jews in the Hellenistic Diaspora.
46
  
This has caused the adoption of anthropological concepts of boundaries as messy places 
of interaction between Jews and Hellenism. Tessa Rajak (2001) suggests that boundaries 
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were always in motion and that they were the place where a great deal of activity 
happened, over and against the idea of a dividing wall between the two in the pre-70 
Diaspora.
47
 This is similar to the approach taken by Maren Niehoff (2001) in Philo on 
Jewish Identity and Culture, who uses the categories of anthropologist Frederik Barth to 
examine Philo’s construction of boundaries. These, she says, are based on the recognition 
of matrilineal descent as legitimate in order to present Jerusalem as the mother city. She 
therefore suggests that in Philo it is the Egyptians, not the Romans, who constitute an 
“other.”48 The approaches of both Rajak and Niehoff are complemented by a book edited 
by John Barclay (2004) which contains several essays about the nature of identity 
formation in Diaspora. In particular, his introduction identifies some modern approaches 
to Diaspora study including the recognition of both “local and translocal identities,” the 
“ambiguity of cultural self-expression,” and the influences of the Diaspora as a site of 
“contested power.”49 What these studies have ultimately acknowledged is that Jewish 
identity in antiquity is a more complicated issue than ever imagined. As Rajak says: 
Far from being the isolated, inward-looking entities of earlier stereotype and 
caricature, these Jews… could and did function as active members of the pagan 
cities in which they lived. From this insight, some scholars have moved on, 
correctly I believe, to an even newer appreciation of the potential limits of 
integration and the cost of preserving a communal identity… rather than focusing 
on these Jews exclusively as practitioners of accommodation, we have moved on 
to ask how they might have expressed resistance, defiance, subversion, or at least 
reserve.
50
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The recent focus on anthropological approaches to identity in the study of Jewish history 
is in many ways a culmination of the work done by anthropologists in the second half of 
the last century. Since recent interdisciplinary approaches to Jewish history have helped 
to elucidate the process of Hellenization and the evolution of diasporic identity, this type 
of approach will also be fruitful to apply to this study of Philo and 4 Maccabees. Barth’s 
(1969) seminal work on boundaries argued that cultural boundaries do not function as 
walls but rather they create opportunities, an approach which has only recently been 
applied to the history of Judaism, especially by Rajak (above). Several of Barth’s works 
will provide the foundation for the methodology of this thesis.
51
  
1.3.3 Diaspora Identity, Symbol, and Patriotism 
Anthropological approaches can also serve to elucidate how Torah functioned in the 
Diaspora, not by denying that there were many Jews who examined the Torah’s teachings 
and sought to live by them, but by providing the added dimension of the Torah as a 
cultural symbol. Therefore some understanding of symbols and their relationship with 
patriotism in the Diaspora can clarify the role which Torah played. The anthropologist 
Anthony Paul Cohen (1994) argued that society is made up of self-conscious individuals 
and that the problem with studying social organization is that the individual’s 
consciousness is never adequately taken into account when viewing the homogeneity of 
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the group.
52
 Therefore symbols can have varying meanings to different individuals. His 
distinction that symbols carry meaning but do not “impose” it is crucial to this study.53  
One of the most effective ways to understand the social homogeneity to which a symbol 
can contribute is to recognize the symbol as a bridge between the individual and the 
group; this is a particularly effective tool in understanding/creating nationalism or 
patriotism.  Anthony D. Smith (2009) provides an approach to symbols which he calls 
ethno-symbolism. He examines how symbols provide meaning for national groups and 
suggests that symbols carry meaning on a number of societal levels.
54
 The application of 
such anthropological understandings of symbols to a historic study of Diaspora Jews is in 
its nascent stages, and one recent study which draws upon these theories is by Nina 
Livesey (2010), who argues that the reason why circumcision was effective as a cultural 
symbol was because of its ambiguity. She says that in 4 Maccabees circumcision was 
used to signify control over the passions, while in Philo it was a vital part of marking 
Jewishness, yet also important in controlling the passions.
55
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1.3.4 Past Approaches 
This literature review has thus far focused on methodological approaches to Hellenization 
and Jewish identity, but will now turn to the issue of how the assumption that Jews and 
Hellenes were in some way at odds governed past approaches to Philo and 4 Maccabees. 
This initially appeared in studies of 4 Maccabees in discussions of how Stoicism fit into 
the text and, consequently, how genuine that Stoicism was. R. B. Townshend (1913) 
thought that there was a uniquely Jewish approach to passions in the text and that they 
should not be eliminated, like the Stoics taught, but controlled by reason.
56
 His 
contemporary, C. W. Emmet (1918), upheld the Jewish goals of the author by arguing 
that the writer wanted to “commend… the accepted Greek philosophy of the day, which 
he regards as fully embodied within the Mosaic Law.”57 Bickermann’s “The Date of 
Fourth Maccabees” was originally published in 1945 and has now been republished 
several times. He attributed the creation of 4 Maccabees to the inspiration which 2 
Maccabees provided for the Jews.
58
 Hadas (1953) utilized Bickermann’s arguments 
extensively, arguing that the work is much more Jewish than Stoic. As evidence of this 
Hadas emphasizes the difference between control and extirpation of emotions; he 
suggests that Greek philosophy was a tool of Judaism for the author.
59
 Hadas’ argument 
that control of the passions rather than extirpation was an original Jewish idea was 
effectively refuted by Robert Renehan (1972), who argued cogently that the author draws 
from Posidonius of Rhodes’ teachings on the control of the passions. Furthermore, 
Renehan argues against attempts to identify the author’s philosophical “school,” 
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suggesting rather that the first two centuries of the Common Era were a period of 
philosophic eclecticism; this work will build on Renehan’s article and attempt to further 
identify the nuances of Middle Stoicism which affect the work.
60
 Modern interpretations, 
as will be shown below, turned to other areas of study without particularly exploring the 
possibilities for the understanding of Hellenization which Renehan’s work creates. 
A similar dichotomy has dominated the approaches to Philo throughout the last century 
and into this one, usually focusing on the question of how Jewish Philo was or, by 
contrast, how Greek. Interpreters of Philo usually claim that this loyalty to either Judaism 
or Greek philosophy made the one subservient to the other. Erwin Ramsdell Goodenough 
(1935) argued that Philo was merely an opportunist attempting to create a unique Jewish 
mysticism which echoed the mysticism of the religions around him, but that he held 
relatively little regard for the scriptures.
61
 This is very different from the position taken 
by Harry Austryn Wolfson (1947). In his expansive work on Philo, he attributes virtually 
all of European philosophy to the advances made by Philo while maintaining throughout 
the work that Philo was extremely faithful to Judaism.
62
 Bickermann (1962) also argued 
that the Jews, including Philo, merely adopted the Greek philosophy which they 
considered to be to the service of God, but that their primary loyalty was to Judaism.
63
 
Samuel Sandmel (1969) contested both of these positions, suggesting that Wolfson and 
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others are overly optimistic and that, in fact, Philo subverts Judaism to Greek principles.
64
 
Yehoshua Amir (1973) disputed this and argued that Philo does show complete loyalty to 
the text of the bible, even though his approach is allegorical.
65
 
Alan Mendelson (1988) argued that Philo saw the Jews as supreme, and that the Torah 
was a marker of that supremacy. He says that Philo thought that others in the world 
around could see this supremacy, and therefore even Gentiles were beginning to observe 
the Torah.
66
 David Dawson (1992) suggests that Philo “subordinates” Greek concepts 
into scripture as well as the meanings of classical texts, while arguing that meaning in 
text is not limited to the text itself but is drawn out and created by a community of 
interpreters.
67
  
Recent studies have focused on the synthesis between Judaism and Hellenism in Philo’s 
writing as scholars have recognized that Philo’s relationship with Hellenism is much 
more complicated that simply acceptance or rejection. Nevertheless, even these studies 
have not, in every case, moved beyond the quest for Philo’s true loyalty. Ellen Birnbaum 
(1996) said that a distinction can be made in Philo’s work between Israel and Jews. 
Therefore, Israel is a spiritual entity, a metaphor for all true philosophers, while the 
category of Jews is an ethnic identity; her study attempts to discuss the dichotomy 
between the two, as people who want to see God (Israel) and people who are bound by 
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the law (Jews).
68
 The tension between Philo’s Judaism and his Hellenistic environs is 
discussed in David Winston (2001) who suggests that Philo is a complete believer in 
mystical Platonism but still believes that the Bible and its interpretation can fit into this 
Platonic worldview.
69
 This is contrasted by Jutta Leonhardt (2001), who examines 
Philo’s approach to worship and argues that he clothes Jewish worship in Hellenistic 
forms while maintaining the supremacy of Judaism.
70
 Jonathan Dyck (2002) discusses the 
culture of Alexandria and imperial policies of Rome, in response to both Dawson’s and 
Daniel Boyarin’s readings of Philo as a cultural revisionist, and he argues by contrast that 
“far from revising (let alone subverting) Greek culture and imperial rule, Philo was 
endorsing it.” This endorsement was a result of Philo’s allegorical interpretation which 
essentially accepted Graeco-Roman intellectual supremacy and conformed to it.
71
 
Himmelfarb (2005) has recently revived Bickermann’s arguments by suggesting that 
Philo’s primary loyalty was to a literal Torah observance, and that he made Platonism 
subservient to it.
72
 So, studies of Philo have still not really moved beyond the question of 
whether his loyalty was to Judaism or Hellenism, and more work is justified to explore 
further the complicated relationship that Philo has with both. 
One of the ways scholars have suggested that Philo universalized Judaism, thereby 
bridging the gap between Judaism and Hellenism, is with a type of nascent natural law 
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theory; this will be discussed in Chapter Three. The issue of whether Philo had a natural 
law philosophy is a well-worn subject. It has evoked serious debate since Adolf Hausrath 
(1875) said that Philo’s view of the Jews was as sojourners in the world who, through the 
enactment of virtue, fulfill a type of universal law.
73
 Goodenough (1962) discusses the 
logos in Philo as the governing force of the world which streams from God and says that 
obedience to the law in Philo is identical to “conformity with the nature of God.”74 In this 
vein, it was Helmut Koester (1968) who scrutinized dozens of ancient texts and suggested 
that Philo had invented the idea of natural law.
75
 However, Richard A. Horsley (1978) 
later concluded that Philo was dependent upon Cicero for the concept of natural law.
76
 
This study will therefore suggest that some form of natural law is present in Philo. David 
T. Runia (1986) examined the use of Plato’s Timaeus in Philo, a source that influenced 
several of his philosophical ideas including the role of the logos, the influence of the 
demiurge in the world, and its role as creator.
77
 Ronald Williamson (1989) saw the 
implantation of the logos into creation as a fundamental part of Philo’s understanding of 
law, so that the patriarchs before the law were already following it.
78
 Marcus Bockmuehl 
(1995) also identifies the logos as the constitution of the universe and claims that, for 
Philo, nature and God are inextricably linked, if not interchangeable; this shows the 
influence of Stoicism (Contempl. 70; Opif. 143; Mos. 2.14, 51).
79
 Gregory F. Sterling 
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(2005) traces the roots of a natural law tradition which includes Philo.
80
 A strong case 
against Philo’s belief in natural law has been made by Himmelfarb (2005), who follows 
Bickermann in saying that Philo rejects the superiority of the spirit of the laws as seen in 
some other Alexandrian writings and instead transforms Platonism to fit the Torah (she 
cites Migr. 89-92).
81
  
The approach to the complicated relationship that both 4 Maccabees and Philo had with 
Hellenism justifies an overview here of the scholarship on several of the issues which 
will be used to explore this topic. In suggesting that both works are interested in 
Hellenistic ends, a review of what those ends are is helpful. Both works are primarily 
interested in the fulfillment of virtue (ἀρετή). Graeco-Roman and Jewish ideas of virtue 
appear in both texts and, again, there is discussion over which is prominent. The 
character of the mother in 4 Maccabees dominates the closing of the work (4 Macc 13:19; 
15:1-16:24) and has fascinated recent scholars. David deSilva (2002) suggests that her 
devotion to the Torah to the point of death is a type of philosophical subversion. He 
argues this by comparing, with Plutarch and Aristotle, the way in which the parental 
affection of the mother for her children shows that she trusts God.  
The more frenzied the experience of passion through which Torah observance 
enables one to remain steady in one’s moral purpose, the more fully he can laud 
the Jewish way of life as the superior ethical philosophy.
82
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Mary Rose D’Angelo (2003), in contrast, examines the relationship between Roman 
“family values propaganda,” in an effort to lead to the concept of “family orthodoxy.”83 
She examines the presence of εὐσεβία as a virtue; this notion, she says, was used by 
Jewish writers after Augustus in an attempt to avoid persecution by appeal to familial 
virtues. In particular, she focuses on the mother taking on masculine qualities.
84
 Susan 
Haber (2006) compares the use of martyrdom in 2 Maccabees, which she says was likely 
was the origins of the mother martyr traditions in 4
 
Maccabees. Here the mother martyr 
chooses circumcision for her sons and passes on instruction. Haber makes specific 
reference to the role of breast feeding in passing tradition, a nurturing act linked to the 
education in the law, which is presented in Chapter Five. She furthermore says that the 
mother standing for the law is shocking in light of the perceptions of women at the 
time.
85
   
The second Hellenistic model of virtue throughout the text which has attracted a great 
deal of attention concerns the use of athletic imagery, which is prominent in both Philo 
and 4 Maccabees. The scholar who first identified this motif in these texts is Victor C. 
Pfitzner (1967). In his study on Paul, he examined how athletic imagery marks striving 
for virtue; he called this an “agon motif.”86 This agon motif is usually connected to the 
issue of reason controlling the passions, a common theme in both Philo and 4 Maccabees. 
George W. E. Nickelsburg (1981) differentiates the victory which reason has over the 
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passions between two types, pleasure and pain, and he says that the cardinal virtues stand 
over the passions as well (4 Macc 1:20).
87
 David C. Aune (1994) presents one of the few 
direct comparisons between Philo and 4 Maccabees on this subject and claims that 
mastery of passion is different for different people in Philo, whereas mastery of the 
passions is possible for all in 4 Maccabees.
88
 Many of the works discussed above take up 
the issue of reason and passions and will be more fully discussed in Chapter Five. 
The virtue that is achieved from observance of Jewish Torah is also clearly a key 
component of 4 Maccabees. DeSilva (1995) argues that obedience to the Torah is the sole 
source of virtue.  
The author’s demonstration seeks to show that the sort of reason which achieves 
the Greek ideal of virtue is devout reason, which is reason choosing wisdom as 
taught in God’s law, the Jewish Torah.89 
He therefore argues that the author’s primary loyalty is to Torah observance. His 
monograph (1998) takes a similar line of argument, suggesting first that the author 
returns to the stories of the Maccabees to promote the value of upholding the Torah, even 
during oppression.
90
 For Jan Willem van Henten (1997), by comparison, the virtue 
achieved is derived from martyrdom, which he says is greatly emphasized by the author 
of 4
 
Maccabees when compared with 2 Maccabees as its source text; 4 Maccabees is 
framed as a contest to test Jewish virtue.
91
 John J. Collins (2000) recently described 4 
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Maccabees as advancing a unique apologetic, which “lies in its combination of a rigid, 
uncompromising obedience to the law” but having “a thorough command of Greek 
language and rhetoric and a veneer of philosophical terminology.” He also emphasizes 
that it presents an agon motif.
92
 
One final approach to 4 Maccabees is worth mentioning here. The difficulties of Diaspora 
and the Hellenistic process has been explored recently in a post-colonial analysis by 
Desilva (2007), who describes how the author of 4 Maccabees is speaking from a place of 
subjection, as a minority in a Greek city. Antiochus IV is representative of Empire, who 
these Jews stand against. He says that the work is meant to criticize the Roman imperial 
system through Antiochus, who “does not take sufficient trouble to understand the inner 
logic and ‘reasonableness’ of the way of life they so readily ridicule and marginalize.”93   
This literature review has been brief by necessity, but is an attempt to identify the issues 
that a comparative study of Philo and 4 Maccabees must address. Studies of Hellenization 
have moved beyond the simple differentiation of Jews and Hellenes as always at odds by 
recognizing that boundaries are complicated and messy places where a great deal of 
interaction and evolution occurs. It is this type of challenge which both of these authors 
face and embody through their rapprochements between Judaism and Hellenistic 
philosophy.  The use of anthropological theories of boundaries, symbol, and identity has 
begun over the last decade, but there is still a great deal of work to be done on these 
fronts. This study will be an attempt to continue to move beyond discussions of how 
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Jewish or Greek Philo and 4 Maccabees were, in an attempt to understand better through 
comparison how both works interacted, adopted, and rejected elements of Hellenism, and 
to identify how they used the Torah in this process.   
28 
 
Chapter 2  
2 Methodology 
In order to understand better both the historical context of Philo and 4 Maccabees and to 
begin to sketch a methodology which can govern this thesis, this chapter will identify 
anthropological approaches to cultural boundaries and attempt to integrate these with the 
relevant historical issues. This will include a discussion of how Torah could function as a 
symbol for both of these authors, which will be further examined in the next chapters. It 
will also continue the recent trend of moving beyond a discussion of which worldview 
Philo and the author of 4 Maccabees were primarily committed to and attempt to do 
justice to the way in which the interaction with Hellenism happened for both authors. It 
will ultimately argue that the desire for a universally applicable system meant that Philo 
and the author of 4 Maccabees were genuinely concerned for the ends of both Judaism 
and Hellenism.   
2.1 The Crisis of Applicability 
As the literature review has shown, the assumption of a “struggle with Hellenism” carried 
through the twentieth century and is even present in recent studies by Feldman and 
Himmelfarb, though admittedly this is a minority position today. Furthermore, in light of 
modern anthropological theory, the struggle motif must be rejected in a study of Diaspora 
Jews. If the idea of a struggle between Judaism and Hellenism is over-simplistic, than the 
idea that assimilation and boundary creation were the responses to this struggle must be 
as well. In 1977 Tcherikover wrote that Jewish identity fluctuated 
29 
 
…between two mutually contradictory principles: between the ambition to 
assimilate arising from the Jew’s desire to exist among strangers by his individual 
powers, and the adherence to tradition, induced in the struggle for existence by 
the need of support from the strong collective organization represented by the 
community.
94
 
 
The failure to understand this struggle properly has carried over to more modern 
discussions of identity and assimilation in the Diaspora. John Barclay, for example, 
recently considered diasporic identity creation to be a process of “negotiation,” and he 
identified three factors which governed that negotiation: the feeling of belonging 
elsewhere, the inability to be full members of either culture, and the susceptibility to 
power struggles within communities which governed their ability to interact with the host 
culture.
95
  
Erich Gruen says that the responses to the perceived challenge of assimilation have 
varied. The first is the one which he said has dominated modern scholarship: a type of 
gloominess that portrays the people as constantly yearning after some real or perceived 
homeland. The second, which does in some way seem to represent the spirit of both Philo 
and 4 Maccabees, is that the Jews recast their identity and became people of the book.
96
 
Gruen advocates caution to both approaches. 
It is not easy to imagine that millions of ancient Jews dwelled in foreign parts for 
generations mired in misery and obsessed with a longing for Jerusalem that had 
little chance of fulfillment.
97
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It seems then that both of these are biblical motifs which scholars have imposed on 
Diaspora Jews.
98
 Therefore the relationship Jews had with Hellenism should be seen as 
much more complicated. 
We can therefore abandon simplistic dichotomies. Diaspora Jews did not huddle 
in enclaves, isolated and oppressed, clinging to heritage under threat. Nor did they 
assimilate to the broader cultural and political world, compromising their past, 
ignoring the homeland, and reckoning the book (in Greek) as a surrogate for 
temple. The stark alternatives obscure understanding.
99
 
The assumption of longing for homeland and a struggle with Hellenism have frequently 
led to the belief that Diaspora Jews made a conscious choice as to where their allegiances 
would lie and the assumption that they always chose from two identities: one to believe 
in with their heart and one to pay lip service to, as Chapter One outlined. The first 
question which needs to be addressed, consequently, is whether the Hellenization process 
allowed room for genuine commitment to both Hellenism and Jewishness by Diaspora 
Jews and, based on Philo and 4 Maccabees, the answer is a resounding yes.  
In order to show that Philo and 4 Maccabees may have been genuinely concerned with 
the ends of both Hellenism and Judaism, it is necessary to discuss briefly the threat which 
Hellenization posed. The crisis which it presented to the ancient world has been called 
one of abstraction, prompted by large-scale cultural interactions. Building on Karl 
Jasper’s interpretation of 800-200 B.C.E. as “the Axial Age,” Benjamin Schwartz 
suggests that increasing contact between peoples during this time period resulted in an 
amplified form of cultural awareness; this was a “standing back and looking beyond.”  
He argues that, though there were precursors of this type of contact at other historical 
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points, this was the first time that it happened on a large scale.
100
 Hans Jonas claimed that 
Hellenization was a crisis on both a historical and philosophical level. The source of this, 
he said, was that the conquests of Alexander the Great created a unity of culture on a 
massive scale which, in turn, caused the abstraction of ideas and beliefs; this was 
primarily the movement of formerly nationalistic religions beyond territory.
101
 The 
ensuing “spiritual crisis,” Jonas says, catalyzed widespread eschatological movements 
such as Qumran and Christianity.
102
 It was manifested in the rise of transcendent ideas 
about God and the growth of “radical dualism of realms of being—God and the world, 
spirit and matter, soul and body, good and evil, life and death.”103 Consequently, this 
crisis has been perceived as the historical problem of mass contact between belief 
structures and competing philosophical ideas.
104
  
The rise of Alexander the Great and the Greek empires certainly prompted Hellenism, but 
it is important to recognize that Hellenization was primarily a socio-economic and 
cultural process rather than an imperial and militaristic one. His conquests would leave 
behind mercenaries in city centres around the Mediterranean; they would be joined by 
other Greek and Macedonian settlers to form a somewhat homogenous ruling class. This 
meant that social mobility, another feature of Alexander’s world, was dictated by 
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acceptance and imitation of the ideals of this ruling class; the remnants of this system 
were present in Philo and 4 Maccabees’ time.105 The division of the empire following 
Alexander’s death saw both the Ptolemies and the Seleucids concentrate on 
Mediterranean based empires, especially as the Seleucids were limited by the powerful 
Maurya Empire to the east; this enabled an increase of travel and diplomacy between 
Greek cities. However, from the Jewish perspective, the ensuing power struggle between 
the Seleucids and the Ptolemies in the Syrian wars made Palestine the primary 
battleground, which framed the stories of 4 Maccabees.
106
 The Seleucid’s power would 
begin its decline after losing much of Asia Minor to the Attalids, who were allied with 
the Romans.
107
  This accounts for the rise of Hellenization in Palestine itself, and the 
struggle for domination that came to be seen by the author of 2 Maccabees as a struggle 
of Hellenization versus Jewishness (2 Macc 4:13).  
Philo and 4 Maccabees have often been described as battling between Jewishness and 
Hellenism, but why was Hellenization still an issue after the rise of the Roman Empire? 
On the one hand, their interest in Hellenism suggests that the issue was far from settled 
and that, even with the rise of the Roman Empire, the challenge that Greek culture 
presented had not diminished for Jews. Rome had itself faced the challenge of Hellenism 
and Hellenistic ideas and had its own ambivalent relationship with it. In 161 B.C.E. 
Greek philosophers were expelled from the city. This prompted a revival of Roman 
imperial mythology written by figures like Quintus Ennius of Rudiae and Marcus Porcius 
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Cato, both of whom expressed disgust at the amounts of Greek literature and knowledge 
that were brought back to Rome from campaigns.
108
 Ironically, these nationalistic literary 
accomplishments relied heavily on Greek culture. Therefore, the perception that there 
was a struggle to be waged with Hellenism was not limited to Jewish literature. 
Ironically, however, these Roman voices of opposition were futile as the spread of 
Hellenism would become, both directly and indirectly, facilitated and increased by the 
rise to power of the Roman Empire well into Late Antiquity.
109
  
On the other hand, there are several reasons to believe that, for both Philo and the author 
of 4 Maccabees, the relationship with Hellenism is more complicated than a simple 
struggle between two clear alternatives. The main evidence for this is that both authors 
are committed to satisfying the main goal of Hellenistic philosophy, the achievement of 
virtue; there is no reason to see their interest as insincere. 4 Maccabees is wholeheartedly 
committed to answering the question whether “pious reason is master over the passions” 
(4 Macc 1:1), and the work attempts to correct the king’s (Antiochus Epiphanes) 
assumption that observing the Jewish religion does not make one a true philosopher (5:7). 
Philo represents a much larger body of literature, but he also seems primarily concerned 
with answering questions of reason and the passions and whether Judaism was a serious 
philosophy (Mos. 1.25; Leg. 1.23). For this reason, it seems that the abstraction and 
challenge which Hellenism presented to Philo and the author of 4 Maccabees, without the 
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benefit of modern pluralism, did not always signify a crisis of difference or struggle 
between two opposing worldviews but rather a crisis of applicability. It broadened the 
framework required to understand philosophical truth and the spectrum of problems 
which any philosophical or religious system had to answer. This seems to be true for both 
Philo and 4 Maccabees: both works seem concerned with answering the ends of 
Hellenistic philosophy as well as the concerns of Judaism (in both cases these are often 
one and the same), namely, the necessity for individual virtue and the need to deal with 
the passions. So, abstraction led to the broadening of philosophical and religious ends. It 
is not strictly a crisis which sought to create paradigmatic superiority but rather it sought 
to respond to and account for an ever-widening concern for applicability. This trend has 
been noted by Boyarin in his study of the Apostle Paul. He describes Paul’s ethos as 
being driven by “a Hellenistic desire for the One,” which he says “produced an ideal of 
universal human essence, beyond difference and hierarchy.”
110
 Without presenting it in 
quite so lofty terms, it does seem like a desire for universal applicability captures the 
spirit of these texts in some way.
111
  
That these Jews were committed to both Judaism and Hellenism can be seen as 
syncretism, but this should not carry with it a value judgment. As was shown above, 
religious syncretism in the Hellenistic world was widespread, brought about by a 
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geographical connectedness which forced the contact of religious ideas.
112
 This 
syncretism is paralleled in the philosophical world by what the classicist Robert Renehan 
calls a period of “philosophical eclecticism” by the first century (and it is important to 
note that many Hellenistic writers considered Judaism to be a philosophy).
113
 To call any 
phenomenon “syncretistic” creates a difficulty in historical study. This is especially true 
in the study of religion, both because of the word’s essentialist preconceptions of the 
nature of religion and its judgmental overtones.
114
 The theorist Robert Baird has 
criticized the category of syncretism as “universal and inevitable” and he suggests that to 
call any religion “syncretistic” is, in effect, to say nothing.115 While it is true that the 
word should not carry judgmental overtones, examining the differences in the ways 
which Philo and 4 Maccabees syncretize worldviews is perhaps the best reason for 
comparison. 
Approaching these works as attempts to legitimize and reconcile both Jewish and 
Hellenistic philosophy demands the move beyond simple understandings of difference in 
the works; this is corroborated by anthropological theories of ethnicity. On the issue of 
the creation of identity for both Philo and the author of 4 Maccabees as Diaspora Jews, 
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the work of anthropologist Frederik Barth makes it possible to see that these writers 
attempt to negotiate familiarity with their Hellenistic neighbors rather than difference. 
Barth calls ethnicity the “social organization of cultural difference” and encourages an 
enlargement of the view of culture. 
Ethnic relations and boundary constructions in most plural societies are not about 
strangers, but about adjacent and familiar “others.”. . . They involve co-residents 
in encompassing social systems and lead more often to questions of how “we” are 
distinct from “them” rather than to a hegemonic and unilateral view of the 
other.
116
  
This not only explains why Jewish authors would need to answer the challenges of Greek 
philosophy as well as Jewish practice, but it also shows why both works might highlight 
the Jews as superlative in fulfilling the Hellenistic goal of virtue. Philo turns to universal 
or natural law to explain why the Jews show the best way to fulfill Hellenistic 
philosophical goals. In 4 Maccabees, Jewish exclusivity is not defined in terms of 
Hellenistic philosophy being wrong or inapplicable; rather, Jewish exclusivity is possible 
because observance of Torah best enables the individual to achieve Hellenistic ends 
where the Hellenes had failed.  So, rather than viewing these authors as having allegiance 
to one view or the other, Barth’s work better describes the way that Philo and 4 
Maccabees interact with Hellenism:  
[P]eople may use multiple images and perform a multiplicity of operations as they 
grope for an understanding of the world, fallibly exchanging, adjusting, and 
reconstructing their models as they harvest the experiences that ensue.
117
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As will be shown below, Barth’s work gives credibility to Himmelfarb’s view that the 
clearly framed challenge between Judaism and Hellenism represents a literary creation 
which was applied ex post facto to the events themselves.   
Furthermore, the historical impact of persecution on Philo and 4 Maccabees complicates 
an understanding of the presentation of difference between Jews and Hellenes. The hope 
of avoiding persecution is also a commonly cited reason for the Jews’ adoption of 
Hellenistic philosophy. While 4 Maccabees is of unknown provenance, Philo’s Egypt in 
the first century of the Common Era saw a rise in anti-Semitism. It is possible that 
persecution of Jews increased because of the alliance with the Romans by the Jewish 
ethnarch, Hyrcanus, who assisted Caesar in his invasion of Egypt.
118
 In any case, 
responses to anti-Semitism in Alexandria can be seen in Jewish writings from as early as 
the Letter of Aristeas, which attributed the creation of the Septuagint to an attempt to 
alleviate Jewish persecution in that city.
119
 Several contemporary sources seem to show a 
Jewish motivation for showing Hellenism and Judaism compatible with one another; they 
face persecution for attempting to function in the Graeco-Roman poleis. The Boule 
Papyrus (19-20 B.C.E.) contains a petition to keep Jews, who its author considers to be 
“impure” citizens of Alexandria, off of the public records list and to ensure that they pay 
the poll-taxes which were imposed on lower-class Egyptians.
120
 Appeals were made to 
the emperor against the Jews. An example of this is the accusations of Isodoros and 
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Lampon to Emperor Claudius that the Jews were “wishing to stir up the entire world,” 
and that they “do not have similar feelings (as the) Alexandrians, but the same fashion as 
the Egyptians.”121 Philo shows how offensive this claim is: he asserts that the Egyptians 
were by nature envious and that they disliked seeing anyone else succeed (Fla. 29).
122
  
Perhaps this accusation, more than any other, shows that the Jews of Alexandria desired 
to function on the level of the Graeco-Roman aristocracy, but were viewed as outsiders. 
This creates a problem however in identifying difference between Judaism and 
Hellenism; in many cases the difference is identified by antagonists rather than by Jews 
themselves. This may be further emphasized by the practical absence of visible 
identifying traits for Jews in the first century. Food laws and circumcision were the only 
defining factors, and circumcision was not necessarily a visible symbol (except at the 
baths) and food laws were in danger of being broken, a problem to which 4 Maccabees 
alludes (4 Macc 5:19-20).
123
 This evidence again points to the possibility that Philo and 4 
Maccabees considered themselves to be true Hellenes as well as true Jews, and that these 
two were not necessarily mutually exclusive.  
2.2 Torah as a Symbol 
This study will argue that one of Torah’s roles for Philo and 4 Maccabees was symbolic. 
Despite the absence of normativity in Diaspora Judaism on a general level, both works 
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follow one historical trend in Diaspora Judaism, the move to a higher reliance on Torah 
both before and after the fall of the temple.
124
 Jack Lightstone argues that even the advent 
of the synagogue circa the third century B.C.E. did not introduce a holy site that would 
replace the temple; rather, through the synagogue movement, Torah became the 
instrument for “decentralizing the locus of sacredness and denationalizing it.”125 Lee 
Levine, in his study of synagogues, has noted that in Diaspora synagogues of Late 
Antiquity the Torah shrine became distinctive.
126
 In the past this prominence of Torah in 
the Diaspora led to the conclusion that Torah became some type of surrogate for the land, 
an idea which Gruen disputes.
127
 Emanuel Maier, for example, argued that Torah 
functioned as a mystical space in the absence of physical homeland, in a manner of 
speaking the Torah became the homeland.
128
  
The belief that Torah became a primary instrument of Diaspora Jewish self-identification 
is fairly widely accepted, but more study is needed of the question of how Torah was an 
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identity marker.
129
 It cannot simply be assumed that the textual and nomistic interest in 
the Torah shown by the Pharisees and the early rabbinic figures carried over into the 
Diaspora, especially since this is not the case for Philo and the author of 4 Maccabees.  
Viewing the Torah as a symbol is not an entirely new development, nor is the 
terminology clear; the mere introduction of the term “symbol” creates ambiguity. 
However, it must be recognized that ambiguity is a desirable trait for the relationship 
between symbol and patriotism, as will be shown below. The value of a symbol to 
cultures in contact, on the other hand, for Philo and 4 Maccabees, is that the ambiguity 
which accompanies it lends itself well to cross-cultural interactions (whether intentional 
or unintentional). Jacob Neusner argued that Torah was a symbol in the sense that it was 
“abstract and encompassing,” that it could stand for every element of Jewish life.130  This 
is supported by the increased prominence of the physical scrolls of Torah in Diaspora 
synagogues, the Torah as unit clearly played an important role in the gatherings of 
Diaspora Jews.
131
 Yet both authors’ interest in the Jewish law seems somewhat 
superficial. 4 Maccabees references the dietary laws, but seems more interested in the 
respect that faithfulness to the ancestral law commands and the Stoic virtues which it 
produces. The author does not highlight nuances in the law itself, and historical figures 
are simply used to show how they overcame their passions (4 Macc 4:2, 17, 3:16). Philo’s 
approach to Torah has been best outlined by Adolf Hausrath: 
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[W]here it (scripture) contradicted his own belief, it was re-interpreted allegorically. 
As the letter of Aristeas showed, the Jewish dietary laws were instead designed to 
contain the whole ethics of the Greeks. If they banned certain foods, it was because 
they want to teach that one should not associate with the unclean. If they prohibited 
the enjoyment of birds of prey, it was so that they (could) recommend justice and 
moderation.
132
 
Philo’s approach to the law, therefore, is to show that it is a container of deeper meaning: 
the allegorical. For both works the virtues which could be produced by following the 
laws were the primary good to be achieved in Torah observance, and both feel somewhat 
free to focus on Hellenistic ends. This should call into question how the Torah functioned 
as an identity marker. It seems that for both of these authors the existence of the Torah 
was just as important as extensive examinations of what the Torah actually taught. Could 
this be reminiscent of the flexibility of Torah in the Pauline writings?
133
  
The recognition of the extent to which Torah carries symbolic meaning for Philo and 4 
Maccabees can help to elucidate social cohesion and patriotism among Diaspora Jews 
beyond extensive theories of nationalism, especially since such studies often focus on 
issues of territoriality or top-down nationalistic constructions, neither of which are 
appropriate to this discussion.
134
 This marks the difficulty of applying nationalistic 
theories to Diaspora Jewish identity. Questions of nationalistic sentiments or local 
patriotism in Philo and 4 Maccabees must be assessed without reference to an actual 
nation. Therefore, a theory of nationalism or patriotism, the term which will be used here, 
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must account for the nationalistic sentiments in these works without necessarily relying 
on territoriality.
135
 
That the Torah carried symbolic meaning (in addition to literal meaning) provides a way 
to understand Diaspora patriotism and the flexibility which that carried for Philo and 4 
Maccabees and, therefore, how it is possible that there was no struggle between Judaism 
and Hellenism. A symbol is valuable because it takes on multifarious meanings 
depending on the interpreter.
136
 Anthropologist Anthony Cohen suggests that symbols are 
often viewed with the faulty impression that every member of a group approaches a 
symbol in the same way. He says that it is not right to assume “the existence of common 
understandings and meanings among even closely knit groups of people.”137 The value of 
a symbol is not that it carries an identical meaning for all members of a group, but rather 
that they think that they are in some level of agreement because they all interpret the 
same symbol. The group provides the framework for the interpretation of the symbol; its 
ideologies influence how the individual perceives it.
 
Cohen cites the impossibility of the 
symbol standing for something literally.  
If symbols did indeed refer objectively to other things they would be redundant: 
why use a symbol if instead you can simply refer to the thing for which it 
supposedly stands? Their potency lies in their capacity to refer to those ‘other 
things’ in ways which allow their common form to be retained and shared among 
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members of a group, while not imposing on these individuals the constraints of 
uniform meaning.
138
  
Therefore, the next chapter will argue that Torah is that thing which signifies without 
imposing meaning in Philo and 4 Maccabees, and therefore both authors feel free to 
apply it to questions of Hellenism.  
So, in the question of identity formation in the Diaspora and the relationship between 
Judaism and Hellenism, a symbol such as the Torah which is meaningful in various ways 
to various individuals can create a sense of group cohesion through a sense of patriotism. 
Ultimately, the ambiguity of the Torah as a symbol for Philo and 4 Maccabees is 
meaningful enough to provide group identity and patriotism but flexible enough to justify 
application to the problems of Hellenism. Therefore patriotism and a universally 
applicable system are not mutually exclusive. Anthony D. Smith’s view of ethno-
symbolism provides the most cogent explanation for how the Torah could function as a 
marker of patriotism in Diaspora. Smith argues that ethnicity and symbolism interoperate 
as real coefficients in national identity, as opposed to the postmodernist view that identity 
is strictly a construction. He says that even leader-constructed nationalism does not create 
meaningful symbols in the life of the nation, but rather that it selects from symbols which 
already exist and politicize them because of the intrinsic and extrinsic value which they 
carry.
139
 Therefore this theory can operate on a functional level for both an ancient 
society and one not necessarily linked to territorially or a national leader.  Smith explains 
how symbolic resources are to be understood in a culture. 
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For ethno-symbolists, that means analyzing communities, ideologies and sense of 
identity in terms of their constituent symbolic resources, that is, traditions, 
memories, values, myths and symbols that compose the accumulated heritage of 
cultural units of population. This is to privilege the domain of culture only insofar 
as we are dealing with the form, contents and appeal of particular ideologies and a 
sense of shared identity. Against the modernist emphasis on material and political 
domains, ethno-symbolists highlight the role of subjective and symbolic resources 
in motivating ideologies and collective actions.
140
 
The politicization, therefore, of existing symbols relates to nation building theory on a 
theoretical level, but in a study of Diaspora Jews it also explains the relationship between 
symbol and patriotism. The Torah as a unit can provide subjective meaning for Diaspora 
Jews and add cohesiveness to communal identity simply by virtue of its existence without 
appealing to content. As the next chapters will show, the text meaning of the Torah is 
important to Philo and 4 Maccabees, but the symbolic value provides the possibility of a 
subjective meaning beyond the text. So, both works appeal to the legitimacy of Torah as 
a whole.  
It seems, therefore, that for these two works the symbol of Torah operates on two levels. 
The first is simply the creation of group solidarity.
141
 The second function is that a 
symbol serves as a bridge between the local and abstract reality. This can account for the 
connection between a Diaspora community and an abstract or translocal idea of Judaism. 
However, this symbolic power of Torah can also be seen as the bridge between text and 
meaning. As will be shown here, for both works the text serves as a localized form of a 
more abstract meaning, either natural law or ancestral law. For both works the abstract 
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meaning is what the truth of Torah points to, but it is also what the truth in Hellenistic 
philosophy points to. As it regards patriotism, the abstract meaning which Torah 
represents for Philo and 4 Maccabees is reminiscent of Benedict Anderson’s idea of a 
nation as an “imagined community.” He says, “It is an imagined political community—
and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.
142
  
This may sound like an argument for the Torah as some type of metaphorical homeland, 
but this is not intended. Alon Confino criticizes Anderson for lacking an explanation of 
how the transition can be made between the tangible local reality and this “imagined 
community.” 
Nationhood is a metaphor for social relations among millions of people: we need 
a method that can tell us about the way people devise a common denominator 
between their intimate, immediate, and real local place and the distant, abstract, 
and not-less-real national world. Such a method must also be a remedy to the 
artificial dichotomy between nationalism from above and from below by 
exploring nationhood as a process by which people from all walks of life redefine 
concepts of space, time and kin.
143
 
So, rather than simply thinking of Torah as metaphorical homeland, a much more 
productive view for the purpose of studying Philo and 4 Maccabees is to see the Torah as 
being a vehicle for transcending the everyday life of these Diaspora Jews and therefore 
providing an answer to the problem of abstraction which Hellenization created. Again, in 
order to avoid false dichotomies, this does not mean that Torah carries meaning in an 
abstract sense and not a local sense; rather, its power as a symbol is that it can do both.  
Furthermore, because the Torah as a symbol does not impose meaning on Philo and 4 
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Maccabees, the language and concepts for understanding this abstraction of Torah come 
from the Hellenistic world in which the authors were immersed.  
Therefore, understanding Torah as a symbol does not necessarily eliminate the necessity 
of observing its statutes, though it certainly seems to for Philo. The impact of social 
cohesion on Jews as a group would, according to Cohen’s thesis, come from the Torah 
carrying meaning without “imposing it.” It is the “representational power” which gives 
the Torah its applicability.
144
 Might this explain why Philo feels free to allegorize the vast 
majority of the Hebrew Bible, or why 4 Maccabees could use the issue of refusing to eat 
pork to claim that the outcome of Jewish observance of the “ancestral law” is superior 
Hellenistic virtue? It is not realistic to suggest that this symbolization of Torah was an 
intentional move by Philo and the author of 4 Maccabees. It most likely was not, but the 
reference to Torah creates a perception of some type of orthodoxy while also leaving the 
authors free to interpret that Torah using Hellenistic philosophy as they saw fit. The thing 
which forms the group, says Cohen, is that “symbols are individual things which provide 
an entry way into the group who shares commitment to those same symbols.”145 
So, recognition of a symbolic element to the Torah permits these authors to fully engage 
in local concerns. This will be explored in the following chapters. However, the balance 
of local participation and abstract connection to Judaism has been further identified in 
several other studies of the Diaspora.
146
 Gregory Sterling, in his study of Jewish self-
                                                 
144
 Mayer, “National Symbols in Jewish Israel,” 2; Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 92. 
145
 Cohen, Self Consciousness, 19.  
146
 Paul Trebilco, Jewish Communities in Asia Minor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 174-
5; Barclay, Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora, 414; Sarah Pearce and Siân Jones, “Introduction: Jewish 
Local Identities and Patriotism in the Graeco-Roman Period,” in Pearce and Jones, eds., 19-20. 
47 
 
definition in Alexandria, argues that two things are paramount: faithfulness to the 
ancestral tradition and the ability to participate fully in Hellenistic culture.
147
 This 
balance of loyalties is the view which will form the basis for the rest of this study, and 
Chapter Four examine the moves in Hellenistic philosophy which define both Philo and 4 
Maccabees.  
2.3 Rethinking Boundaries as Opportunities 
One other area of anthropology from which a study of these two works benefits is that of 
cultural boundaries and ethnic identity. Frequently the field of religious studies 
(especially Jewish and Christian studies) is dominated by the ideal of a cultural or 
religious boundary which can be represented by outward movement.  For past studies of 
Hellenization, this is usually a perceived boundary which the group intentionally sets up 
for protection.
148
 These views of boundaries rely on the assumption that a cultural 
boundary is some type of wall or the “edge of a container,” to which the group cognition 
and actions may expand but not pass.
149
 Frederik Barth has argued instead that the idea of 
a boundary as a wall needs to be expanded and that boundaries must be re-envisioned as 
things which create opportunities: 
Human activities perversely create such leakages through conceptual boundaries 
by reconnecting what has been separated. They arise above all from two sources: 
inventive behavioral responses to the imposition of boundaries, and the effects of 
social positioning.
150
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He explains the opportunity for linkage, which is created by the imposition of a physical 
or social boundary, by using the image of a smuggler, for whom a boundary creates 
opportunity rather than limits. Boundaries, he says, are formed across complex linkages, 
and frequently the deterioration or acceleration of one link or another can change the way 
a boundary is perceived.
151
 
Understanding boundaries as opportunities can enrich the interpretation of both Philo and 
4 Maccabees by challenging several assumptions which have driven scholarship. First, 
the problem of “how much Hellenism was acceptable” was once thought to dominate the 
psyche of these works and Hellenistic Judaism as a whole, but as seen above it has 
recently been called into question on a methodological level, and seems inappropriate to 
Philo and the author of 4 Maccabees.
152
 Gruen has shown that the reality in Palestine was 
that the Hasmoneans, rather than gaining cultural superiority through the Maccabean 
victory and the establishment of the Hasmonean dynasty, actually resembled Greek client 
kings in every way. They adopted Greek ways of life including clothing and coinage.
153
 
Gruen’s work dismantles the assumption that Judaism and Hellenism were constantly at 
odds and says instead that “the Hasmonaean age, in fact, discloses a complex pattern of 
reciprocal relations and mutual dependency that undermines the concept of fundamental 
antagonism.”154  
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So, once the assumption of “the struggle with Hellenism” is set aside, both works can be 
seen to be genuinely concerned with reconciling Hellenistic and Jewish philosophy, 
especially in an effort to be taken seriously as philosophers by their counterparts. Both 
works needed to be committed to the ends of Hellenism because of what this chapter has 
called a “crisis of applicability,” essentially that Hellenism raised questions to which 
these Jewish writers were concerned with providing answers. Boundaries and difference 
did not create separation, but rather presented opportunities to create universally 
applicable systems. The way in which Torah functioned as a symbol will be further 
examined in the following chapters, but it ultimately created the ability for these authors 
to espouse Hellenistic ends freely and still consider themselves to be committed Jews.  
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Chapter 3  
3 Philo: Jewish Universalism through Natural Law 
Philo mixes elements of Hellenistic philosophy in his work, and he shows the greatest 
affinity with Platonic and Stoic thought (he is usually categorized as a Middle Platonist). 
This heterogeneous approach to philosophy may have been a tendency of Alexandrian 
philosophy, but there are insufficient sources to assess properly the similarities with 
Philo’s contemporary, Eudorus of Alexandria. In an attempt to broaden the applicability 
of Judaism, Philo embodies the Platonic vision that the universe is not generated for an 
individual but the individual is for the world (Plato Leg.10).  
The previous chapter argued that the crisis of Hellenization led to the need for a 
worldview which answered the problems of both Jews and Hellenes. This chapter will be 
an examination of how Philo treats the idea of nomos. Often the term does not refer to the 
Torah, as will be made clear throughout. It will be argued here and in the next chapter, 
building on the anthropological approaches to symbol in the previous chapter, that for 
Philo and 4 Maccabees the Torah stood for something beyond its text and content. Since 
Philo and 4 Maccabees also could be sincerely committed to the ends of both Judaism 
and Hellenism, this chapter will argue that Torah is used to broaden the scope of 
Judaism’s applicability rather than to narrow it. 
There are three key moves to broadening the application of Judaism in Philo. The first is 
the adoption of a tendency that will be shown to be widespread in Alexandrian writing, 
the universalization of history. The second has been well studied: in allegorical 
interpretation, the Torah, rather than being the marker of Jewish exclusivism, becomes 
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the vehicle in which cultural boundaries are crossed. Finally, Philo sees reality to be what 
the text of Torah signifies rather than what it contains; this is the allegorical reflection of 
the natural law, the logos which was written into creation. It is important to note that 
identifying the symbolic function of the Torah for these authors does not imply a 
judgment as to their faithfulness to Judaism. Philo’s approach to Hellenization is to 
promote the universal acceptance of the Torah and he sees it (and the Jews) as the 
fulfillment of the Hellenistic vision and therefore as a light for the world. The historical 
context of this chapter has been extremely well studied, but perhaps a fresh and 
interdisciplinary examination of how Philo interacts with Hellenism will be fruitful.  
3.1 Universal History: Undermining Difference  
Universalism, or the broadening of the applicability of Judaism, was a common 
phenomenon in the Diaspora. Terence Donaldson has noted that this universalism was 
understood historically as involving converts to Judaism through proselytism (not the 
intentional proselytism of Christianity), the idea of “righteous Gentiles” (non-Jews who 
fulfill the demands of Torah without knowledge of it), and the notion that the 
Gentile/nations were part of a shared eschatological vision.
155
 James Dunn says that there 
was a long history of “a recognition that Israel’s calling was not simply for their own 
benefit.” Written into the covenant with Abraham is an insistence that other nations will 
be blessed because of Abraham’s faithfulness.156  Peder Borgen argues that there were 
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“cosmic and universal principles that were revealed in the Law of Moses” but, while this 
is true for Philo, these cosmic principles do not seem to be limited to the Torah.
157
  
There were numerous attempts to universalize Jewish history in Alexandrian literature in 
the two hundred years prior to Philo. The Letter of Aristeas claims that the Jews 
worshipped the God who created the world, whom the Greeks called Zeus (Let. Aris. 16). 
One of the well-attested strategies for this type of historiography was to set up the patron 
philosopher or religious figure as the source for all wisdom that was to follow, often they 
were thought to have inspired Plato.
158
 This trend gave rise to Philo’s claim that Plato 
borrowed from Moses, an argument first advanced in the second century B.C.E. by the 
Jewish writer Aristobulus (Aristob. 4.3). Artapanus made Moses responsible for the 
ingenuity of ancient nations such as Egypt and Ethiopia (Artap. 3.27.11). Philo also 
begins his account of creation by attributing Platonic and Aristotelian ideas to Moses:  
Moses, both because he had attained the very summit of philosophy, and because 
he had been divinely instructed in the greater and most essential part of Nature’s 
lore, could not fail to recognize that the universe must consist of two parts, one 
part active Cause and the other passive object; and that the active Cause is the 
perfectly pure and unsullied mind of the universe, transcending virtue, 
transcending knowledge, transcending the good itself and the beautiful itself; 
while the passive part is in itself incapable of life and motion, but, when set in 
motion and shaped and quickened by Mind, changes into the most perfect 
masterpiece, namely this world. (Opif. 8-9) 
This attribution of philosophy to a cultural patriarch or matriarch was not unique to 
Judaism: others claimed that Plato had borrowed from Pythagoras (see also Plutarch, On 
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Isis and Osiris).
159
 This method of historiography was yet another factor in Philo’s ability 
to move beyond distinctions between Judaism and Hellenism. As Isaiah Gafni said, Jews 
had no problem “perpetuating the culture that surrounded them,” as long as it could be 
asserted that the culture traced its ingenuity back to Jewish forefathers.
160
 Once again this 
downplays any potential struggle with Hellenism. Dawson called Philo’s use of Moses 
“the basis for a revisionary stance toward the dominant, Hellenistic culture,” but the 
difficulty with this perspective is that the evidence suggests that this was a common 
feature of Alexandrian historiography.
161
 To call Philo a revisionist based on this 
evidence does not seem accurate. It seems that, as the previous chapter argued, Philo is 
simply drawing on multifarious resources in an attempt to understand his world and to 
cause Hellenistic philosophy and Jewish history to coalesce into a universal picture. This 
also is clarified by Barth’s envisioning of boundaries as opportunities: the desire here is 
to “reconnect what has been separated.”162 
3.2 Allegory: Meaning beyond the Text   
If universalization was the tendency in Philo, as in other Jewish writers, Philo’s use of 
allegory must be connected to this trend. The remainder of this study will therefore turn 
to a detailed study of Philo’s use of the term nomos, as evidence of Philo’s allegorical 
approach and the natural law that the allegory is meant to highlight.
163
 Furthermore, it 
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seems that the allegorization of Torah is evidence of the symbolic way in which it 
functions for Philo.  
From the very beginning of his writings, Philo wants to find a balance between literalism 
and allegory.  
While among other lawmakers some have nakedly and without embellishment 
drawn up a code of the things held to be right among their people, and others, 
dressing up their ideas in much irrelevant and cumbersome matter, have befogged 
the masses and hidden the truth under fictions. Moses… refrained, on the one 
hand, from stating abruptly what should be practiced or avoided, and on the other 
hand, in the face of the necessity of preparing the minds of those who were to live 
under the laws for their reception. (Opif. 1-2) 
Despite this apparent respect for balance between the literal and figurative, Philo does 
seem to place a much higher emphasis on the value of allegorical reading.
164
 This is 
accompanied by occasional derision of those who do not sense the allegorical meaning of 
the law. For example, in his discussion of Joseph and Potiphar, Philo speaks of “those, 
who are occupied with literal wording of law (τοῖς ῥήματα τοῦ νόμου 
πραγματευομένοις), rather than with its allegorical (πρὸ ἀλλεγορίας) interpretation” (Leg. 
3.236). The people who are unable to see the allegory are referred to as “those who 
follow the letter of the law (νόμον γραφῆς).” Philo frequently opposes these people 
(Conf. 14; Migr. 89). He even calls them “the self-satisfied pedantic professors of 
literalism (τοὺς τῆς ῥητῆς πραγματείας σοφιστὰς καὶ λίαν τὰς ὀρφῦς ἀνεσπακότας)” 
(Somn. 1.102).
165
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While the allegorical trend carries extensively throughout Philo, only several examples of 
how he interprets allegorically will be given here for the sake of brevity.
166
 What these 
examples show is the primacy of Hellenistic virtues and the Stoic war with the passions 
in Philo’s interpretive framework. When speaking of the snake in Genesis, he references 
the “snake fighter” (Lev 11:22) which is found in the “detailed law (μέρος νόμοις).” He 
says that this is, “nothing but a symbolic representation of self-control, waging a fight 
that never ends and a truceless war against intemperance and pleasure” (Opif. 163). In the 
story of Joseph mentioned above, Philo suggests that Potiphar was a eunuch. Therefore, 
the temptation for Joseph is no longer adultery (as Potiphar was unable to consummate a 
marriage), but rather the giving in to pleasure. Joseph says, “I shall be sinning against 
God the Lover of virtue, were I to show myself a lover of pleasure; for this is a wicked 
deed” (Leg. 3.235-7). This love of virtue continues in a very confusing allegorical 
interpretation of Hagar and Sarah, in which Philo identifies the relationship between 
philosophy and virtue. In this story the perfect counsel of Sarah, who Philo says is the 
picture of divine virtue, is to tell Abraham to bear seed with Hagar, who he says is the 
image of philosophy and learning. Through Hagar’s instruction, Abraham is brought to 
the place where he can “apply his unfettered powers to virtue.”  Virtue is presented as the 
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end and the means to achieve happiness: “let that which seems good to virtue be law for 
each one of us; for if we choose to hearken to all that virtue recommends, we shall be 
happy” (Leg 3.245). On the law which makes the camel unclean because it does not “part 
the hoof” (Lev 4:4), Philo says that it carries no meaning if taken literally, but the hidden 
meaning is that the “soul of the keen learner, when it has by listening taken in this and 
that proposition, does not hand them over to forgetfulness” (Agr. 131).167 So, this 
becomes an analogy for learning.  
These (limited) examples show the trend of Philo’s hermeneutic and exegetical approach, 
but it is not clear how to reconcile allegory with Philo’s identity. So, his use of allegory 
has mistakenly been seen as a method of subjecting Hellenistic philosophy to Judaism. 
Dawson has argued this. 
It becomes unmistakably clear that for Philo allegorical interpretation is an effort 
to make Greek culture Jewish rather than to dissolve Jewish identity into Greek 
culture. Philo’s concern for the specific practice of Judaism in Alexandrian 
society reveals that for him allegorical interpretation is central to Jewish 
communal identity and survival in a hostile environment.
168
  
Dawson’s view is that there is an implicit power dynamic in Philo’s allegorization. This 
is directly opposed to Adolf Hausrath’s view cited above, which gave Philo freedom to 
mold Judaism to Hellenism.
169
 Indeed, Hausrath’s view might seem more convincing in 
light of the examples given above: in every case it is the principles of Hellenistic 
philosophy which dictate how allegory should be applied, for the pursuit of virtue and the 
conquering of passions and the importance of education. 
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It is tempting to attribute Philo’s use of the ambiguous idea of allegory to a desire for 
self-preservation in either of his two communities. It is this ambiguity which Dyck has 
said would sit well with all elements of the Jewish community in Alexandria.
170
 But, the 
use of allegory need not be thought of as a way to reconcile two irreconcilable 
worldviews; rather, it is possible that his use of allegory is based on an assumption that 
the worldviews complement each other. For Philo, allegory makes Torah the means by 
which to bridge any real or perceived difference between Hellenism and Judaism since, 
interpreted allegorically, Torah points to universal ideas of virtue. 
This view is contrary to Dawson’s thesis that allegory is a type of dialectical evolution of 
meaning which he calls “cultural revisionism.” As mentioned above, he considers Philo’s 
primary loyalty to be to Judaism. The thrust of his argument is as follows: the desire to 
understand Torah prompts a reading of a philosophical text which is intended to clarify 
the meaning of the Torah but, in applying this meaning out of context, it becomes subject 
to Judaism.
171
 This type of hermeneutic power which Dawson applies to the interpreter is 
said to subordinate the meanings of philosophical texts to scripture, but Dawson’s 
argument fails to account for whether scripture would be subordinated to the same power 
dynamic, if it were to be clarified through Hellenistic philosophy (it would). Furthermore, 
as Chapter Five will show, Philo’s loyalty was not only to understanding Judaism, but he 
engaged with significant discussions within Hellenistic philosophy.  
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The use of allegory seems to come out of a Hellenistic paradigm of body-soul dualism 
and Stoic theories of language. Both of these assume that the real meaning is not in the 
text itself, but in what the text represents. The dualism of body and spirit will be taken up 
in Chapter Five, but Boyarin says that Philo’s hermeneutic approach can be seen as 
reflecting his approach to anthropology, namely, that just as the human person contains a 
body and soul, so the text represents the body, and the spirit of the text the soul.
172
   
Language is represented in two senses; in its “content” it represents the higher 
world, while in its form it represents the structure of world as an outer form and 
inner actuality.
173
 
In this case the thing which the text symbolizes is behind the text: the text provides a link 
to this real thing. Dawson also says this. He emphasizes that language, like a name, is an 
imperfect physical manifestation of a perfect unseen reality.
174
  This idea is not only 
taken from a Platonic dualism between body and soul or the real world and the world of 
the forms. A clear Stoic view of language is also built into Philo’s allegorical approach, 
which Diogenes Laertius said for the Stoics was the appearance (φαντασία) of thought 
(Diog. Laert. 7.49).
175
 Plutarch said that the Stoics saw everyone as being two, one the 
visible and one the unseen, in flux and changing (Comm. not. 1083A-1084A). Seneca 
records 
They (the Stoics) say that a “sayable” is what subsists in accordance with a 
rational impression, and a rational impression is one in which the content of the 
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impression can be exhibited in language. (Sextus Empiricus, Against the 
Professors, 8.70 [SVF 2.187])
176
  
In Stoic thought meaning behind language was based on the logos which language 
represented. Language becomes a way to bridge the seen and unseen world, and the 
Stoics spent significant time distinguishing between words and meaning, as well as on the 
physical element of voice as being the “vibration of air” (this is similar to the special type 
of divine voice which Philo says is created by God to give the laws: Dec. 33-35).
177
 It 
seems that Dawson’s claim that Philo subjects Hellenistic philosophy to the Torah is 
therefore further challenged by the fact that the paradigm which forms Philo’s view of 
Torah is Hellenistic.  
The allegorical interpretations of laws do not, in Philo’s mind, render all of them 
obsolete. The argument here is that the Torah operates as a symbol but, as the previous 
chapter argued, this is not used to make either Judaism or Hellenism superfluous. The 
Torah maintains its value. Therefore, the use of allegorical interpretation is not to be seen 
as diminishing the value of the text and its proclamations. On the issue of circumcision, 
for example, Philo says that there is no reason to do away with it. Though it represents 
the excision of pleasure, he says that to only pay attention to the inner meaning of things 
would mean being  
. . . ignorant of the temple and a thousand other things. . . . We should look on all 
these outward observances as resembling the body, and their inner meanings as 
resembling the soul. It follows that, exactly as we have to take thought for the 
body, because it is the abode of the soul, so we must pay heed to the letter of the 
laws. (Migr. 92) 
                                                 
176
 Long, Hellenistic Philosophers, 1:196 
177
 Long, Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics, 132.  
60 
 
The laws remain containers of a deeper meaning, but the body of the text is not to be 
discarded either, therefore showing the perfect harmony between Philo’s two worlds and 
therefore the balance which he seeks to strike between them. Any link between Torah and 
patriotism is therefore influenced by what Anthony Smith calls “double historicity.” This 
is the “embeddedness in very specific historical contexts and situations, and their 
rootedness in the memories and traditions of their members.”178 Therefore, Philo applies 
a subjective interpretation of the abstract meaning of the Torah, but this does not preclude 
him from ascribing meaning to it from his Hellenistic background.    
3.3 Natural Law: Meaning behind the Text  
If allegory serves as the bridge to the thing behind the text of Torah, which Philo is trying 
to approach, then the real thing behind the law is the law of nature. In his introduction to 
De decalogo, Philo also uses the term unwritten law (ἄγραφος νόμος) to explain what has 
gone before, and even his examination of the Decalogue is not focused on literalism but 
the allegorical (Decal. 1). The place to begin in order to understand what it is that 
allegory refers to is Philo’s work on creation.179 Natural law for Philo centres on a view 
of creation. He believes that the universal and unwritten spirit of the laws are recorded 
into the character of the world and, though Torah represents the highest corporeal form of 
their presentation, the laws are accessible by other means; this seems to be similar to the 
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earlier Stoic view of natural law.
180
 In his writing on the first human he says that “the 
world was his city,” but he describes that world as having a constitution which is 
“nature’s right relation, more properly called an ‘ordinance,’ or ‘dispensation,’ seeing it 
is a divine law” (Opif.143).181 
There was an emergence of natural law thinking before Philo. In Sirach (second century 
B.C.E.), the Torah became synonymous with divine sophia, which Michael Stone says 
gave it “a cosmic dimension . . . As a result, Torah becomes not just the specific 
revelation to Moses on Sinai, but the pattern according to which the universe was 
created” (see Sirach 24).182 One result of this was the universalizing of ethics, which can 
be seen, for example, in the writings of the first century poet Pseudo-Phocylides. He 
presented a collection of wisdom maxims designed to persuade non-Jewish readers of the 
value of the Jewish laws; these are also reminiscent of the so-called Noahide laws which 
were guidelines for all humanity and combined Septuagint and “Greek nomological” 
material.
183
  Rudimentary ideas of natural law have been further identified in other 
Alexandrian literature: the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, Sibylline Oracles 3, and 
the Wisdom of Solomon. According to Gregory Sterling, however, Philo represented the 
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culmination of natural law thinking, since he could say “the world is in harmony with the 
law and the law with the world.”184 Therefore, the broadening trend in Alexandrian 
historiography did not only lead to a concept of natural law for Philo, but an idea of 
natural law in which the Torah was its reflection.  
Philo has been called a Middle Platonist, but it seems that this title is too limiting as he 
presents a complicated syncretism. As will be shown below, he applies a Platonic 
dualism to the understanding of creation. Nature proceeds from a Platonic God who is 
also an Aristotelian First Cause (Opif. 8-9). However, this world of the forms or the idea 
of creation, in which are rooted the laws of nature, means that in the dualism between the 
world of forms and the material world the Stoic idea of ethics can take place. Therefore, 
the “laws of nature” can operate according to Stoic principles. Philo’s ethics reflect the 
Stoic interplay between nature and the human. 
The Platonic idea of the world of the forms is present throughout Philo’s work. He 
explains that the world as an ideal exists first within the mind of God, and then the real 
world is modeled on this ideal. With his contemporary, Eudorus of Alexandria, he 
thought that 
the monad will be the archetype of Form, the Dyad the archetype of Matter. The 
working of the monad on the dyad produces the world of Forms, or Ideas, which, 
as reason-principles or logoi (or collectively as the logos), create the material 
universe.
185
   
Therefore, Philo says in De opificio mundi that, in the creation of the world, God saw that 
in order for there to be a good imitation (μίμημα) there had to be a good model 
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(παράδειγμα) (16-19). These are the same terms used in Plato’s Timaeus (28E, 48E) to 
describe the way in which God made the world, drawing upon a model. Philo also seems 
to be influenced by Stoic ideas of nature in identification of the corporeal and the 
incorporeal in all things. Despite the relative absence of metaphysics, the Stoics too 
thought that action and words could be imitations of “cosmic events,” because the entire 
world was the manifestation of the logos.
186
 The dualism between the seen and unseen 
therefore extends throughout Philo’s teaching. For example, when he speaks of the 
temple, he says,  
There are… two temples of God: one of the this universe, in which there is also as 
High Priest his first born, the divine word, and the other the rational soul, whose 
priest is the real man; the outward and visible image of whom he is who offers the 
prayer and sacrifices handed down from our fathers, to whom it has been 
committed to wear the aforesaid tunic, which is a copy and replica of the whole 
heaven, the intention of this being that the universe may join with man in the holy 
rites, and man with the universe. (Somn. 1.215) 
From an understanding that the whole world is based on an ideal in the mind of God, 
Philo can situate the place of Torah in this paradigm. Torah becomes a reflection, or 
perhaps even a manifestation, of the model of the God’s ideal world. He describes the 
Torah as being a small thing that holds colossal beauty and has the ability to completely 
overwhelm those who come into contact with it; and he uses the metaphor of a seal which 
holds an image of a thing (Opif. 6). So, the Torah is not the thing itself, but the best 
reflection of the thing, “not mimesis of the visible but representation of the invisible.”187 
This is almost identical to the modern definition of a cultural symbol, as expressed by 
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Anthony Smith.
188
  Philo sees the Torah as a replica of something eternal, indeed, the best 
replica. The law is a picture of another reality. The laws which it presents are described 
as being “fixed, not by the creation to which we belong, but on principles which are 
divine and older than we and all that belongs to earth” (Post. 89). 
Therefore, the legitimacy of the Torah, as well as all other earthly laws, is based on its 
(their) reflection of these laws of nature. There is a cosmic sense to these laws. In the first 
instance this is God’s hand in the universe. For example God “guides all things in what 
direction he pleases as law and right demand” (Opif 46). Humankind has no choice but to 
be in awe of the ways that the planetary bodies interact: several times Philo describes the 
complicated way in which the world acts as being controlled by “the laws of perfect 
music” (Opif. 54, 70). The complicated operations in nature are described as being 
“carried out under ordinances and laws which God laid down in His universe as 
unalterable” (Opif. 61). Human action reflects this law written into nature, for example, 
in the numerous national festivals.  
The sun, too, the great lord of the day, bringing about two equinoxes each year, in 
the Spring and Autumn, the Spring equinox in the constellation of the Ram, and 
the autumn equinox in that of the Scales, supplies very clear evidence of the 
sacred dignity of the seventh numbers… during them there is enjoined by law the 
keeping of the greatest national festivals. (Opif.116) 
This also reflects the harmony with nature, which will be discussed below. The dualism 
that is written into nature further extends to the human being. As Boyarin has noted, 
Philo considers the two creation stories of Genesis to describe two different creations, the 
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literal creation of humans and the spiritual creation of Adam as mind and Eve as soul.
189
 
Chapter Five will show Philo’s adoption of the Platonic ideas of soul, but the human is 
reflected in his elegant cosmic system through body and mind.  
Through this (the mouth), as Plato says, mortal things have their entrance, 
immortal their exit; for foods and drinks enter it, perishable nourishment of a 
perishable body, but words issue from it, undying laws of an undying soul, by 
means of which the life of reason is guided. (Opif.119) 
Throughout Philo’s writings there is a discrepancy between the seen and the unseen and 
in every case it is the unseen thing that carries the real meaning: the soul bears the true 
meaning, not the body; the spiritual is the true essence, not the corporeal. This is also true 
of the Torah, the laws of God reflect the laws of nature, and at some points might even be 
considered interchangeable. The natural laws are not limited to the Jews, however, but 
they apply to the whole world (Ios. 29). 
It is worthwhile to compare Dawson and Boyarin in their views of Philo’s concept of 
language. They both feel that Philo presents language as representative of an unseen 
meaning, as discussed above. For Dawson this meaning is represented in Torah, while for 
Boyarin the limitation of language is that the real thing behind the language is accessible 
by other means, or perhaps by other language. When Philo’s view of natural law is 
applied to the practice of virtue, it seems that Boyarin is correct. Torah does not function 
as the exclusive carrier of meaning, since virtue is accessible through the natural law.  
When Mind, the ruler of the flock, taking the flock of the soul in hand with the 
law of nature as his instructor shows it the way with vigorous leadership, he 
renders it well worthy of praise and approval, even as he subjects it to blame if he 
disregard nature’s law and behave slack and carelessly. (Agr. 66) 
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Great indeed are the efforts expanded both by lawgivers and by laws in every 
nation in filling the souls of free men with comfortable hopes; but he who gains 
this virtue of hopefulness without being led to it by exhortation or command has 
been educated into it by a law which nature has laid down, a law unwritten yet 
intuitively learnt. (Abr. 16) 
The application for Philo seems to be that virtue is open to anyone who follows the 
natural law, and it can be achieved without the Torah. What is especially strange is that 
the achievement of virtue without reference to a written law leads to a natural pride in the 
Jewish forefathers for Philo, because they developed virtue without even needing the law.  
The enacted ordinances are not inconsistent with nature . . . the first generations 
before any at all of the particular statutes were set in writing followed the 
unwritten law with perfect ease, so that one might properly say that the enacted 
laws are nothing else than memorials of the life of the ancients, preserving to a 
later generation their actual words and deeds. (Abr. 5) 
It seems that, in relating the stories of heroes from Jewish history, Philo’s interest is in 
virtuous individuals who fulfill Hellenistic (especially Stoic and Platonic) models of 
virtue before they are chosen by God. This is the case with Noah who, Philo says, found 
favor with God by the virtue of his very nature (Leg. 3.77).  In his discussion of 
Abraham, Philo says that Abraham observed the law of God and that the law is “nothing 
else than the Divine word enjoining what we ought to do and forbidding what we should 
not do” (Migr. 130). He also shows a high respect for Abraham because he acquired 
virtue without needing the law: “he did them (the commandments), not taught by written 
words, but unwritten nature gave him the zeal to follow where wholesome and untainted 
impulse led him” (Abr. 275). 
The best example of Philo’s celebration of individual virtue is Moses: his personal virtue 
as both lawgiver and interpreter is paramount to Philo’s understanding of the laws 
themselves. He calls Moses “the greatest and most perfect man that ever lived” and says 
67 
 
that “the glory of the laws which he left behind him has reached over the whole world, 
and has penetrated to the very furthest limits of the universe” (Mos. 1.1-2). Moses’ virtue 
is the reason that God chose him to bear the laws, since he adhered to an unwritten 
standard of virtue before the written standard was given to him. 
He (Moses) was ever opening the scroll of philosophical doctrines, digested them 
inwardly with a quick understanding, committed them to memory never to be 
forgotten, and straightway brought his personal conduct, praiseworthy in all 
respects, into conformity with them; for he desired truth rather than seeming, 
because the one mark he set before them was nature’s right reason, the sole source 
and fountain of virtues. (Mos. 1.48)  
Moses is presented as a savant in all areas of learning, mastering the zenith of all cultures 
and religions. Therefore Moses fulfills God’s ideal before God ever calls him and, in 
doing so, the character of Moses also fulfills both the Stoic model of virtue (having 
access to every pleasure of passion in Pharaoh’s house, but denying them all, Mos. 1.25-
28), and the Platonic model of virtue (being the philosopher king, Mos. 2.2).
190
 The 
supremacy and excellence of Moses showed his fulfillment of Hellenistic virtue before 
the law is given and is the reason that he is chosen to bear the law.  
The fact that the patriarchs’ virtue is emphasized in Philo shows not only that virtue is 
accessible outside of the law, but also that Philo was following the wider trends of 
Hellenistic historiography (as does 4 Maccabees): history should be interesting and 
readable, but people reading it should also be spurred on to proper and virtuous action.
191
 
The first century also witnessed a rising interest in historical biography, an approach 
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exemplified by Plutarch, for example, who tended to reveal the character of prominent 
individuals didactically.
192
 Therefore Philo’s whole project seems to follow a Hellenistic 
desire for historical figures which inspired individuals to virtue, an identical approach to 
4 Maccabees. Furthermore, the celebration of virtuous individuals challenges the views 
of both Dawson and Himmelfarb. They both suggest that Platonism is transformed by the 
Torah because of Philo’s apparent insistence on practice of the law.
193
 However, since 
Philo is the most proud of individuals who achieved virtue without needing the Torah, it 
seems that any emphasis on praxis cannot be limited to the enacting of Torah 
commandments.  
A few remarks can be made based on the anthropological framework laid out in the 
previous chapter. It should be said that remarks on identity, both here and in the next 
chapter, are not necessarily indicative of any real or lived identity, but rather focus on the 
literary identity which Philo and 4 Maccabees construct. The understanding of Torah as 
the symbol for a natural law in Philo’s work has a fascinating application to Philo’s 
understanding of boundaries. Here, rather than defining or limiting Jewish identity, Torah 
itself serves to create the link to Hellenistic philosophy. It transcends the boundary and 
the very symbol which is often historically understood to define and delineate Judaism 
becomes that which unites and crosses the cultural bridge between, what Frederik Barth 
calls, “adjacent and familiar others.”194 Therefore the Torah becomes a symbol for the 
Jews being a light to the nations and, for Philo, contains the culmination of all Hellenistic 
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philosophy; it is the pinnacle of human law but, because it is only a corporeal 
manifestation of the natural law, it points to deeper truths and meaning.  
Boyarin has argued that the unintended consequence to Philo’s merging of philosophical 
traditions was the softening of Jewish laws and traditions, which is not necessarily the 
case.
195
 Instead, the individual laws take on an expanded meaning and greater cultural 
relevance and applicability. In any case, whatever Philo’s motives were, the application 
of natural law which is corporeally (though not exclusively) represented by Torah serves 
to transverse any boundary between Judaism and Hellenism, rather than to reinforce a 
boundary wall.
196
 Birnbaum’s recent work corroborates this. After a careful analysis of 
the Philonic corpus, she concluded that “Hebrew” and “Jew” were national/ethnic 
designations, while the term “Israel” was reserved in Philo’s thought for all true 
philosophers of any nation.
197
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Chapter 4  
4 4 Maccabees: Jewish Superiority through Ancestral 
Law 
The author of 4 Maccabees’ approach to Hellenization is to show how Jews are superior 
to Hellenes in the practice of virtue. The fascinating thing is that, rather than using Jewish 
ends to justify this superiority, the author focuses almost completely on showing how the 
Hebrews in 4 Maccabees champion Hellenistic ethics. The author draws from 
multifarious systems of honour and virtue to create the impression of Jewish superiority 
on many levels, especially by creating a greater emphasis on the boundary between 
Judaism and Hellenism. Ironically, in showing how the observance of Torah achieves 
virtue, the author uses the idea of ancestral law which had a long tradition in Greek 
philosophy. Therefore the Torah becomes the way for the author to transcend the 
boundary between Judaism and Hellenism, which is first emphasized in order to show the 
superiority of Jewish ethical practice.  
Torah is not simply used figuratively in the work. In the literal sense, the prohibition 
against eating pork sets the scene for the contest which will be presented (4 Macc 1:34, 
5:2, 6). The issue of circumcision is also mentioned once in passing (4:25).
198
  However, 
in a symbolic sense, it is not the prohibition that really matters; rather, it is in the strength 
that the Hebrews have to withstand the attacks of the king that they prove themselves 
superior. This chapter will argue that the author of 4 Maccabees highlights and sharpens 
the difference between Jews and Hellenes that was already present in the source text, 2 
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Maccabees. The two sides are then compared in their attempts to achieve virtue and 
Hellenism is shown to fall short while Judaism is successful at creating virtue. However, 
the work is so thoroughly Hellenized that the author’s understanding of virtue is 
completely dominated by Middle Stoic ideals, so that the Jews and Hellenes on a 
metaphorical level become two horses in the same race.  
4.1 The Emphasizing of Difference  
Fourth Maccabees’ answer to a crisis of applicability is to frame Judaism and Hellenism 
as two distinct sides in a contest for virtue and then to claim Jewish superiority. 
Difference is used here as a literary form of juxtaposition between the virtues of the two 
nations, so the author will identify and accentuate this difference. It is important to 
recognize that the difference between Jews and Hellenes presented here is not necessarily 
a real or historical difference, but rather a literary difference created by the author.
199
  
Himmelfarb has argued cogently that the idea of a clear distinction between two factions 
of Jews and Hellenes in the Maccabean struggle is a literary creation of 2 Maccabees. 
The same dichotomy is recreated by the author of 4 Maccabees.
200
 What is fascinating is 
that, in contrast with the difference between Jews and Hellenes in 2 Maccabees, 4 
Maccabees creates an even stronger emphasis and clarification of the difference between 
these two groups. Remarkably, this shows an evolution towards a stronger definition of 
difference between Judaism and Hellenism. While both works contain positive views of 
the high priest Onias and negative references to Jason, who bought the priesthood from 
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Antiochus (2 Macc 4:7-8; 4 Macc 4:1, 16-17), 4 Maccabees omits the lengthy description 
of the power struggle for the priesthood as well as the detailed history of Antiochus’ 
attacks on Egypt which are contained in 2 Maccabees (2 Macc 3:1–5:26). It seems that 4 
Maccabees omits from the source text most of the details about the Jewish factions in 
Palestine in order to downplay the role of Jews who were labeled “philhellenes” in 2 
Maccabees, thereby placing the blame for Hellenization on Antiochus Epiphanes as an 
outsider and enabling a more unitary depiction of “the Jews.” As mentioned in the 
literature review, this challenges van Henten’s view that the shift to Antiochus shows 4 
Maccabees’ Asia Minor provenance, because the distinction seems to serve a literary 
rather than historical function.
201
  
The focus on Antiochus serves to further identify the literary boundary which the author 
wishes to draw between Judaism and Hellenism. Since the problem of Jewish Hellenizers 
was still well known in the first century (Josephus, for example, called Aristobulus I a 
“philhellene” [Ant., 13.318]), the omission of the reference to philhellenes in the work 
cannot be an accident. So, Himmelfarb’s thesis of difference as a literary creation is 
justified and, between 2 and 4 Maccabees, there is a consistent interest in sharpening this 
difference between Jews and Hellenes.  
This difference is further emphasized by downplaying the theme of God’s judgment on 
the Jews from 2 Maccabees, in which there is frequent discussion of how the Jews were 
being rightly punished by God, as a judgment for sins.  
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Now I urge those who read this book not to be depressed by such calamities, but 
to recognize that these punishments were designed not to destroy but to discipline 
our people. (2 Macc 6:12) 
After him they brought forward the sixth. And when he was about to die, he said, 
“Do not deceive yourself in vain. For we are suffering these things on our own 
account, because of our sins against our own God. (2 Macc 7:18) 
Fourth Maccabees does not contain this sentiment, aside from the references to the 
martyrs atoning for the sins of their people, which will be discussed below. The author of 
4 Maccabees seems to downplay the culpability of the Jews and the divine punishment 
that follows. 
This emphasizing of difference between Judaism and Hellenism could perhaps be seen as 
an emergence of the type of Jewish identity which is present in Rabbinic Judaism. This 
was also marked by a gradual movement away from both Hellenistic philosophy and the 
Greek language. Some of this may have been fairly benign; there is some admiration for 
Greek thought in the Rabbinic writings. Shaye Cohen has identified an example of this in 
the text “may the beauty of Japheth (Greeks) dwell in the tents of Shem (Jews)” (Gen. 
Rab. 9.27).
202
 There is also an extensive discussion in Megillah over the issue of 
translation, some of which even shows respect for the law translated into Greek (y. Meg. 
1.9. B). At its worst, however, the attitude towards Greek language in Rabbinic thought is 
downright hostile. Even the Septuagint is overwhelmingly rejected, as for example in the 
following text from the Soferim: “the day the Law was translated was as hard for Israel as 
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the day they made the golden calf; for the Torah could not be translated according to all 
its demands” (1.7-8).203 
The emphasizing of the differences between Hebrews and Hellenes in 4 Maccabees will, 
ironically, show the ubiquitous impact of Hellenization. This author, in trying to present 
Jewish patriotism in the first century, had nowhere else to turn and no other cultural 
resources to draw upon to define excellence and national superiority than those available 
in the Hellenistic world around, much like Philo. Again, Barth’s view of familiar and 
adjacent others is justified.
204
 As will be shown below, the author is so thoroughly 
Hellenized that even this portrayal of Jewish patriotism relies almost completely on 
Hellenistic philosophy.  This (thoroughly Hellenized) opposition to Hellenism is also 
seen in Johann Cook’s recent study of the Book of Proverbs in the Septuagint, which 
challenges the ancient myth that they were translated by Aristobulus (Prov 6:10, 2:11, 17 
LXX).
205
  
The recognition of the author’s intent to identify difference based on his cultural milieu 
challenges Emil Schürer’s labeling of the author as a philosophic “dilettante,” it is not 
accurate to question motives if the author had no other resources upon which to draw.
206
 
The next chapter will also take issue with this because 4 Maccabees is so interested in 
Hellenistic ends and the discussions which were internal to Hellenistic philosophy.  
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4.2 The Personification of Difference 
The difference between Jews and Hellenes which the author hopes to accentuate is best 
understood through an examination of the literary function of the character of the king. 
First of all, the question why 4 Maccabees would be interested in the evil deeds of a 
Seleucid king after the rise of Rome is answered by a perusal of early Jewish literature: 
Antiochus Epiphanes is frequently the figurehead for anti-Jewish sentiment. His dealings 
with Jerusalem are recorded by Josephus, who says that the sons of Tobias were cast out 
of Jerusalem by the High Priest Onias and fled to Antiochus Epiphanes to beg him to 
attack Judea, which he did with a surprising fury and hostility towards the Jewish 
customs (Wars 1.1-2). As the quintessential antagonist in Jewish history, Antiochus 
figures prominently in 4 Maccabees as in 2 Maccabees before it.
207
  
Consequently, Antiochus becomes the personification of the difference which the author 
of 4 Maccabees emphasizes, and he functions as a caricature which juxtaposes 
Jewishness and Hellenism. One of the uses of caricatures in Diaspora literature was as a 
“Jewish construct” of both Greeks and Hellenism, as Erich Gruen says: 
Jewish compositions constructed the Hellenes as foils, as aliens, as the “other,” 
thereby the better to set off the virtues and qualities of their own nation. . . [T]he 
insistence on differentiation, even an unbridgeable gap, between the cultures on 
the one hand, and a high esteem for the Greek achievement and those responsible 
for it on the other, could reinforce rather than cancel out each other–to the 
advantage of the Jews.
208
 
Antiochus Epiphanus’ words and thoughts are put forward in the form of Rededuelle or 
“speech duels,” which David deSilva says serves to heighten the effect as well as to 
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occlude any objections to the argument by stating them and defending against them, 
deSilva’s examples of this are given below.209 This means that the king, his servants, and 
even the narrator provide convincing reasons of why the law could or should be 
abandoned, and in each case the protagonists rebut the arguments and reinforce Torah 
observance.
210
 In these exchanges, Antiochus’ argument is offered first:  
Before I begin the tortures against you, old man, I would give you these words of 
advice, namely, that you save yourself by tasting pork, for I respect your age and 
your gray hairs. Although you have had your gray hairs for such a long time, you 
do not seem to me to be a philosopher, since you observe the religion of the 
Judeans. Why should you abhor eating the very excellent meat of this animal 
when nature has provided it? …Will you not awaken from your silly philosophy, 
dispel the nonsense of your reasonings, and, adopting a mind worthy of your age, 
pursue a true philosophy of what is beneficial? (4 Macc 5:5-13) 
Young men, with friendly feelings I admire each and every one of you. Greatly 
prizing the handsomeness and the goodly number of you brothers, so many as you 
are, I not only advise you not to display the same madness as that of the old man 
who has just been tortured but also encourage you to yield to me and take 
advantage of my friendship. Just as I am able to punish those who disobey my 
orders, so I can be a benefactor to those who obey me. Trust me, then, and, if you 
disown the ancestral law of your polity, you will receive leading positions in the 
affairs of my state. Enjoy your youth by embracing a Greek way of life and 
changing your mode of living. (4 Macc 8:5-10) 
You see the result of your brothers’ stupidity; they were tortured on the rack and 
died for their disobedience. You too, if you do not obey, will die, a tortured 
wretch, before your time. But if you obey, you will be my friend and will lead in 
the affairs of my kingdom. (4 Macc 12:3-5) 
Antiochus presents several different elements of temptation. The temptation to follow 
other philosophical traditions, the offer of positions in his government, and the threat of 
torture all challenge the Hebrews to forsake their way of life. In each instance, however, 
the martyrs stand firm in their opposition.  
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O Antiochus, we who have been persuaded to adopt a way of life in accordance 
with divine law do not consider any compulsion more powerful than our ready 
obedience to the law. Therefore we do not deem it right to transgress the law in 
any way. (4 Macc 5:16-17) 
Why do you delay, O tyrant? We are ready to die rather than transgress our 
ancestral commandments. For we would cause our forebears to be ashamed with 
good reason, if we did not show ready obedience to the law and to Moyses our 
counselor. (4 Macc 9:1-2) 
Irreverent tyrant, most impious of all the wicked, were you not ashamed, when 
you have received good things and your kingdom from God, to kill his attendants 
and torture on the rack those trained in piety? For these deeds, justice will store up 
for you a fire more fierce and everlasting and tortures, which for all time will not 
release you. (4 Macc 12:11-12) 
By recognizing the literary juxtaposition of Judaism and Hellenism in the exchanges of 
these two characters, the antagonism which forms the pathos of the author of 4 
Maccabees can be located in the king’s words. Hellenism is not to be accepted, but is 
presented as a foil and a temptation. The king entreats them to embrace a “Greek way of 
life” (8:8). Here the voice of the enemy is presented, the threat is unveiled, and the 
temptation seems to be simply to accept Greek culture. In his response, the martyr makes 
a remarkable counter statement, saying that he is proving through his sufferings “that 
children of the Hebrews alone are invincible in virtue’s defense” (9:18). The result of the 
emphasizing of difference between Judaism and Hellenism is to be able to claim 
supremacy in virtue over and against the Greek conquerors. 
4.3 Difference and Patriotism 
With the creation or emphasizing of the difference between the Jews and Hellenes, the 
author can now turn to a major goal: highlighting the superiority of the Jews. Once 
difference is emphasized, Jewish patriotism can stand out and once again the 
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emphasizing of the boundary creates an opportunity.
211
 It ultimately accentuates the 
Jew’s ability over the Hellenes to achieve the same philosophical goals.  The issue for the 
author of 4 Maccabees is not “how much Hellenism is acceptable,” unless one speaks of 
the Hellenes’ fondness for eating pork, but is rather “who better enacts virtue and true 
philosophy?” From this perspective the whole work is framed as a patriotic struggle, 
drawing upon various cultural motifs such as ancestral law, athletic imagery, and 
maternal affection (below) to display the ethical superiority of the Jews.  
At first glance, this presentation of Jewish patriotism seems reminiscent of the rejection 
motifs in Rabbinic literature in which God offered the Torah to the Gentiles and they 
refused and therefore became guilty of impiety.
212
 However, since the whole work is 
driven by the Stoic premise stated in the first paragraph – “pious reason is master over the 
passions” (4 Macc 1:1) – it would be naïve to suggest that the differentiation here is 
simply a distinction between those who are Torah observant and those who were not. The 
fact that the author states this Stoic question as the subject of the book again challenges 
the assumptions that Hellenism and Judaism were always at odds as well as that the 
author only uses Hellenistic ideas pragmatically; this in turn challenges interpretations 
which claim that 4 Maccabees argues for Jewish superiority through nuance and subtlety. 
For example, Emil Schürer says that the reason employed within the texts to conquer 
emotions “is not human reason as such (like the Stoics), but ‘pious reason’ (ὁ εὐσεβὴς 
λογισμός).”213 Distinctions between a “Jewish” control and a “Stoic” eradication of the 
passions have also been proposed (the next chapter will discuss this as a Stoic, not 
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Jewish, concern).
214
 Furthermore, attempts have been made to identify nuances within the 
text’s approach to distinct schools of Hellenistic philosophy, leading Hadas to argue that 
the only Stoic in the story is the King.
215
 The next chapter will address these concerns, 
but these arguments based on nuances in the text are complicated by the philosophical 
eclecticism of the day, rendering the recognition of distinctions between ideologies 
impossible.
216
 
4.4 The Transcending Torah 
It could be argued that the author of 4 Maccabees attempts to emphasize the Torah as a 
marker of difference. However, like Philo, the author of 4 Maccabees explains the law by 
explaining the Hellenistic ethic behind each law. 
It is for this reason, certainly, that the temperate Joseph is praised, because by 
mental effort he overcame sexual desire. For when he was young and in his prime 
for intercourse, by his reason he nullified the frenzy of the passions. Not only is 
reason proved to rule over the frenzied urge of sexual desire, but also over every 
desire. Thus the law says, “You shall not covet your neighbor’s wife. . .or 
anything that is your neighbor’s.” In fact, since the law has told us not to covet, I 
could prove to you all the more that reason is able to control desires. (4 Macc 2:2-
6) 
Given the necessity for universal applicability which Hellenism demanded, the author 
either knowingly or unknowingly draws upon imagery which carries weight in a 
thoroughly Hellenized culture to explain why Torah observance is valuable for the 
attaining of virtue.  
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The author describes the Torah as ancestral law (πάτριος νόμος), and the observation of 
ancestral law becomes a source of virtue. Remarkably, just as Philo uses the Torah to 
transcend cultures, so too the author of 4 Maccabees ends up using Torah as a symbol 
which transcends the differences identified above; it becomes that which has meaning in 
both cultures. This means that the Torah becomes the best method for achieving 
Hellenistic virtue; as will be argued in the next chapter, this is especially achieved 
through education in the Torah.  
The first stage in the shift to the Torah as a symbol of ancestral law is the emphasis in the 
text on the virtue which is achieved by being faithful to something without being swayed 
by emotions. 
Even if, as you suppose, our law were in truth not divine and we wrongly 
considered it to be divine, not even so would it be possible for us to invalidate our 
reputation for piety. (4 Macc 5:18)  
Never may we, the children of Abraam, think so basely that we play the coward 
and feign a role unbecoming to us! For it would be irrational if, after we have 
lived life until old age in accordance with truth, and maintained, by observing the 
law, the reputation of such a life, we should now change our course and ourselves 
become a model of impiety for the young so that we should set a precedent for 
eating defiled food. It would be shameful if we should survive but a little while 
and during that time be a laughingstock to all for our cowardice; shameful if we 
were despised by the tyrant as unmanly and did not champion our divine law even 
unto death. So then, O children of Abraam, die nobly for the sake of piety! (4 
Macc 6:17-22) 
The reasons given for observing the law in these quotations are interesting: reputation, 
avoiding cowardice and subterfuge, maintaining rationality and consistency, setting an 
example for the youth, and being manly are all given as reasons not to deviate from the 
Torah. However, the text of the Torah is not referenced. 4 Maccabees is instead, as Paul 
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Reddit says, interested in “not simply pious behavior, but rational living.”217 In this case 
the Torah again functions as a symbol, not on the level of its contents but in the way in 
which the laws are observed; it does not matter which laws are observed, but the fact that 
observing the Torah leads to a rational life becomes the theme of the text. Since the 
Hebrews are unwavering and do not display passions in the face of torture, the author can 
claim their virtuous superiority. 
The way in which Torah functions as a symbol, is that the author is intent through the 
work in showing that the Torah is the Jews ancestral law.
218
 One of the primary uses of 
ancestral law in the Hellenistic world was to highlight the difference between legitimate 
and illegitimate law. This is a theme that is mentioned in a similar fashion in 2 
Maccabees (2 Macc 6:6, 7:2), but it is greatly expanded and emphasized in 4 Maccabees. 
Early Greek thought saw a close relationship between the idea of a tyrant (τύραννος) and 
ancestral law. Aristotle records that a tyrant was one who went against the ancestral 
statutes of the Athenians (Ath. Pol. 16.10). Herodotus said that there is no act of tyranny 
that is worse than meddling with law and ancestral customs (3.80.5). In the famous trial 
of Andocides for his violation of the Eleusinian sanctuary, his accuser, the priest Callias, 
attempts to use the ancestral law to convict him to death, as opposed to the inscribed law 
which only sentenced him to a fine.
219
 An appeal to ancestral law, therefore, was an 
appeal to a higher legitimacy than the written laws of the land or the authority of a tyrant. 
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When he had plundered them, he issued a decree that, if any of them were found 
living according to the ancestral law, they should die. (4 Macc 4:23) 
I do not so pity my old age as to subvert the ancestral law by my own act. (4 Macc 
5:33) 
O boys, noble is the contest to which you have been summoned for the testimony 
you can bear for our nation. Fight zealously in defense of our ancestral law! (4 
Macc 16:16) 
Therefore, ancestral law is portrayed as the legitimate authority. It is in following this 
legitimate authority that true virtue can be achieved. These Jews patriotic struggle is 
therefore rooted in the need to defend this authority from the tyrant who has chosen to 
undermine it.
220
  
This Greek idea of ancestral law and tyrant can be seen elsewhere in Jewish history. 
Josephus makes a similar comparison in presenting Herod Antipater as a tyrant for 
creating a sculpted golden eagle; Josephus says he is corrected by two young men who 
are seen to be defending the ancestral law (Ant. 17.149).
221
 Josephus also records that the 
Pharisees followed an “ancestral tradition” (Ant. 13.10.5). Philo also uses ancestral law to 
distinguish between a true king and a tyrant in the story of Melchizedek. Here Philo says 
that a king is one who is “the author of laws,” while a tyrant is the author of lawlessness 
(Leg 3.79). As Martin Goodman has argued, in all of these cases the appeal to ancestral 
law, rather than specific reference to the text of the Torah, becomes a way to create an 
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ethical justification for behaviour.
222
 For 4 Maccabees, therefore, ancestral law broadens 
the applicability of the Torah so that it can also apply to a Hellenistic world.  
It seems difficult to explain with certainty why this reference to ancestral law is so 
prominent. The lack of reference to the Torah might appear strange. David deSilva says:   
For those Jews committed to the Torah, the author presents material to reinforce 
the commitment and to strengthen them for the endurance of whatever 
disadvantages would accompany identification with the Jewish race; . . . for 
wavering or confused Jews, the author presents material to exhort them to take a 
stand for the Torah and piety, calling them back to commitment to Jewish 
particularism.
223
 
One possibility is that the author of 4 Maccabees is writing to a Jewish audience for 
whom the Torah carried very little cultural weight, and ancestral law is added to 
strengthen the appeal. Otherwise, it becomes unavoidable that the author might have a  
Gentile audience in mind as well as Jews. The audience may well have been thoroughly 
Hellenized Jews, but this would strengthen the point that the difference between Hellenes 
and Hebrews is a literary construction rather than a historical reality, since this would 
mean that they were so Hellenized that they needed to see Torah as ancestral law to 
believe that it was worth upholding.  
Again, this is not to say that the author of 4 Maccabees has no interest in the text of the 
Torah, but that there are elements in the work which can only serve to justify Torah 
observance to highly Hellenized readers. The powerful symbolism that the Torah presents 
is therefore, to borrow from Confino, the bridge between some type of local Hellenized 
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Judaism and an abstract perception of Jewish identity which is equally Hellenized.
224
 The 
tyrant tries to persuade the martyrs to abandon their ancestral law by offering them 
positions in his government (4 Macc 8:7), but they refuse. This same ancestral law then 
becomes the lynchpin for explaining how the Jews withstanding torture can achieve the 
Stoic virtues. It serves to show extremely Hellenized people why the Jewish religion best 
achieves the virtues which their own Hellenized society extolled.  
Therefore, it seems that 4 Maccabees makes a universally applicable argument for Jewish 
patriotism. Patriotism is presented as the willingness to die for their nation, which is an 
exact parallel to the Hellenistic ethic that dying for the state is a high honour (Cicero, Fin. 
3.62-68). So, the martyrs’ victory is thorough. First of all, they have brought national 
peace, religious revival, and defeat of their enemies (4 Macc 9:24, 16:16, 18:4). So 
complete was their victory and bravery, the author of 4 Maccabees says, that Antiochus 
commended their bravery to his troops, and that by emulating this they were able to 
conquer Egypt (17:23-24); they therefore become not only the most virtuous, but the 
models of virtue even to their enemies. Finally, in withstanding the assaults of Antiochus 
Epiphanes they are shown to be victorious in the interchange:  
For since you can neither sway our reason nor compel us to eat defiling food, is 
this not your overthrow? Your fire is frigid to us, the catapults painless, your 
violence unavailing. (4 Macc 11:25-27) 
So, the work ends with a celebration of Jewish patriotism. Throughout the Hellenistic 
world, being loyal to the land from which one came was an important thing.
225
 There are 
frequent examples of devotion to one’s homeland in Greek literature, which Simon Swain 
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calls “local patriotism.”226 Swain says that the integration into Roman political life did 
not create the same homogeneous ruling class that the Greeks had; rather, people 
maintained local identities.
227
 This is to say that it cannot simply be assumed that the 
patriotism advocated in 4 Maccabees is any different than the other local patriotisms 
operating across the Greek and Roman world; Jews should not be considered uniquely 
patriotic. Instead, just like those around them, loyalty to one’s ancestral traditions 
garnered a certain amount of respect.  
Perhaps the most interesting use of this patriotic rhetoric in 4 Maccabees is that the 
martyrs become saviours of their people; their blood provides a ransom (ἀντίψυχος) for 
the sin of the nation (17:10, 21). Although it is not used often in classical texts, the term 
ἀντίψυχος means “given for life” or “giving one’s life for another.”228 This is the only 
mention in 4 Maccabees of any wrongdoing by the Jewish people; as discussed above, 
this was a significant theme of 2 Maccabees. It is interesting to note that this is not the 
same word for ransom that appears in Christian literature (λύτρον). However, ἀντίψυχος 
does appear in the letters of Ignatius, generally with a less grandiose meaning. It several 
times occurs as a term of endearment (Eph. 21; Smyrn. 10; Poly. 2, 6).  
The individual dying for national redemption was also a well-established tradition in 
Greek culture of individual martyrs dying and bringing glory to the nation.
229
 No matter 
what the influence, the conclusion of 4 Maccabees first emphasizes the difference 
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between Greeks and Jews, and then claims nationalistic victory. This has been gained, not 
by military victory, but by ethical superiority. 
Truly the contest carried on by them was divine, for then virtue, testing them for their 
perseverance, offered rewards. Victory meant incorruptibility in long-lasting life. 
Eleazar contended first; the mother of seven boys entered the fray, and the brothers 
contended. The tyrant was the antagonist; the world and human society looked on. 
Godliness won the victory and crowned its own athletes. Who did not marvel at the 
athletes contending for the divine law code? Who were not astonished? (4 Macc 
17:13-16) 
 
Wherefore those who, for the sake of piety, gave over their bodies to sufferings were 
not only admired by human beings but also deemed worthy of a divine inheritance. 
Thanks to them the nation gained peace; by reviving loyalty to the law in the 
homeland, they pillaged their enemies. (4 Macc 18:3-4) 
 Therefore, patriotism is upheld through Torah observance, but that observance also 
fulfills Hellenistic virtue while showing the Hellenes to be faulty in their understanding 
of how to achieve that virtue. Personal virtue is fulfilled by observance of the law and the 
protagonists’ ability to face martyrdom comes from their “education in the law,” and 
from the opening it is clear that this is the only way to exercise pious reason.  
Fourth Maccabees is evidence that the process of Hellenization was so complete that at 
least this Diaspora Jew had to create and emphasize the difference between Judaism and 
Hellenism in a literary way, while using ideas typical of Hellenistic moral discourse. 
Nevertheless, a type of Jewish exclusivism could even be maintained by someone who 
was thoroughly Hellenized and had a thorough Hellenistic education, but it was necessary 
to draw on resources from a Hellenized world to create that type of patriotism. What is 
ironic is that, even in an attempt to create patriotism, framing the Torah as ancestral law 
renders it something that transcends any cultural boundaries and is able to be relevant to 
Hellenized readers.  
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Chapter 5  
5 Towards Hellenistic Ends 
What is remarkable about both of these works is the extent to which both are invested in 
relevant and contemporary discussions of Hellenistic philosophy. It seems that Philo and 
the author of 4 Maccabees do not simply appropriate Greek philosophy into a Jewish 
context, but that they are driven by it in their attempts to understand their world. These 
influences show how problematic it is to try to identify these authors’ loyalties, or to 
ascribe to them over-simplistic ideas of identity.  If, as the previous chapters argued, 
Torah is a symbol which is used to broaden the scope and applicability of Judaism rather 
than narrow it then the interest in Greek philosophical discussions is not contradictory to 
a view of the importance of Torah.   
On the level of historiography, this chapter will show the nature of the contact that Jews 
had with Hellenism. This was not contact with static paradigms but with evolving 
discourses which they were able to play a role in shaping. Since the descriptors 
“Platonic” and “Stoic” have frequently been ascribed to both Philo and 4 Maccabees, it is 
proper to identify where the two authors fit in relation to these movements. As this 
chapter will show, the remarkable fact is that they do not only have an intellectual stake 
in Jewish discussions but in those dominating Hellenistic philosophy as well. It will seek 
to emphasize that the discussions which were evolving in the Hellenistic schools of 
philosophy had their own evolution concurrently to Jewish philosophy, and that these 
influenced one another.  
88 
 
It is important to note that each of the issues referenced briefly in this chapter were part 
of significant discussions ongoing for centuries before, and monographs can and have 
been dedicated to these. Rather than rehearse centuries of arguments, this chapter will 
briefly identify elements of the struggle with passions which were contemporary to both 
Philo and 4 Maccabees. Therefore this chapter should serve as a historical identification 
that these issues were relevant to Philo and 4 Maccabees rather than an extensive 
philosophical discussion of the evolution of each issue.  
The primary discussions of Hellenistic philosophy which are identified in this chapter are 
the application of the Platonic tripartite soul to the struggle with the passions, the 
importance of education to this struggle, and a brief discussion of freedom and agency in 
morality. Though Stoic sources from this time period are scarce, Posidonius of Rhodes 
(135-50 B.C.E.) will be cited extensively in this chapter as background for both works.
230
 
5.1 Philosophical Eclecticism 
The context for Philo and 4 Maccabees is a highly eclectic philosophical landscape.
231
 
With the discovery of fragments of Posidonius of Rhodes, a link to Middle Stoicism has 
become clear for both Philo and 4 Maccabees. Though there was an overzealous 
interpretation of Posidonius’ role in all areas of Hellenistic philosophy in the last century, 
the connection with Philo and 4 Maccabees is worth exploring (although the list of 
influences should be expanded to include other philosophers like Eudorus of Alexandria, 
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and perhaps Antiochus of Ascalon).
232
 These philosophers represent the type of approach 
taken by both Philo and 4 Maccabees, the blending of Platonic, Stoic, and Peripatetic 
thought which has been categorized as Middle Stoicism and Middle Platonism. 
Posidonius lived in Rhodes, a place which Nock said “showed, in an outstanding degree, 
the old civic virtues.” Though few of his works remain, Posidonius was apparently such 
an influential figure that Cicero sent a work to him asking for editing. Furthermore, Pliny 
the Elder reports that when Pompey went to Rhodes he sat in on a lecture of Posidonius 
(Nat. 7.112).
233
 Posidonius is considered a Stoic, and accepted Stoic physics, but he 
revolutionized old Stoic ideas by accepting elements of Platonic and Aristotelian 
ethics.
234
 John Dillon speculates that there must have been some teacher in Alexandria 
teaching a type of Platonism built on the teachings of Antiochus of Ascalon, and that he 
may have been influenced by Dion and also the Stoic Diodorus, who studied under 
Posidonius. Eudorus of Alexandria and Philo became the purveyors of this unique blend 
of Alexandrian Platonism.
235
 The difficulty presented in fully examining the Stoicism in 
both Philo and 4 Maccabees is that none of the works from Early or Middle Stoicism 
survive complete; as A.A. Long as lamented, the extensive sources from Later Stoicism 
are from a time when something like a Stoic orthodoxy had been developed, while the 
sources which reflect the evolution of that development have been lost.
236
 Perhaps the 
greatest “problem” of philosophical history faced here, then, is the simple lack of sources. 
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It is fully possible to argue that both Philo and 4 Maccabees relied heavily on Middle 
Stoicism, this will be done below, but Middle Stoicism remains relatively obscure.
237
 
For both 4 Maccabees and Philo, Jewish history provides an answer to the problem of 
moral uprightness and both have startling assertions to make: those who have best lived 
virtuous lives can be found among the Jewish historical figures, many of whom fulfill 
Hellenistic ideals of ethical perfection. The history of Hellenistic Jews during this period 
has often focused on whether or not they were considered true philosophers by their 
peers. Arnaldo Momigliano has argued that the Septuagint was the translation of Jewish 
philosophy, but that it perhaps did not receive the high esteem hoped for.  
The consequence must now be faced. About 300 B.C. Greek intellectuals 
presented the Jews to the Greek world as philosophers, legislators and wise men. 
A few decades later, the alleged philosophers and legislators made public in 
Greek their own philosophy and legislation. The Gentile world remained 
indifferent… The failure of the LXX to arouse the interest of the pagan 
intelligentsia of the third century B.C. was the end of the myth of the Jewish 
philosopher.
238
 
Erich Gruen, on the contrary, claims that Jews are often highly regarded as philosophers 
by their contemporaries. This respect is often linked to varying myths about the Jewish 
people’s escape from Egypt, most of which consider the Jews to be high class of 
philosophers who were either expelled from or left Egypt by choice.
239
 For the sake of 
this study, the discussion of how they were regarded by their peers is secondary to the 
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question of whether they considered themselves to be more than simply Jewish 
apologists, and the way that they interact with Hellenistic ideas suggests that they did.   
5.2 The Tripartite Soul and the Passions 
One of the primary discussions in contemporary philosophy which Philo and the author 
of 4 Maccabees are interested in is the question of how an individual could wage war 
with the passions. By the first century B.C.E. the answer to this Stoic question had 
changed drastically, in favor of control rather than eradication of the passions. Many 
scholars of 4 Maccabees have recognized this distinction in the work.
240
 The attention 
given to the passions is also one of the most significant differences between 2 and 4 
Maccabees. In 4 Maccabees reason is master (αὐτοδεσπότης) of the passions. It rules 
(κρατέω) and is ruler (αὐτοκράτωρ) over the emotions, which the author says is the main 
issue addressed in the book (4 Macc 1:13). Fourth Maccabees makes it clear that the way 
in which reason rules the passions is not to destroy them, but to prevent the individual 
from succumbing to their power:  
For reason does not overcome its own passions but those opposed to justice, 
courage and self-control, and it overcomes these not so that it destroys them but 
so that one does not give way to them. (4 Macc 1:6)  
It is obvious that Philo is aware of the distinction between control and eradication of the 
passions, though his position on the subject is not as easy to discern as that of the author 
of 4 Maccabees. There seems to be some disagreement in Philo over whether passions are 
controlled or extirpated, and in some respects it seems that he does see it as possible to 
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extirpate the passions. The figurehead for this extirpation is Moses, and his battle with the 
passions draws clear Stoic lines: 
Moses thinks that it is necessary completely to extirpate and eradicate anger from 
the soul, being desirous to attain not to a state of moderation in the indulgence of 
the passions, but to a state in which they shall have absolutely no existence 
whatever…God has endowed the wise man with the best of all qualities, the 
power, namely, of eradicating his passions. (Leg 3.129, 131)  
It seems that Philo makes a distinction between passions and suggested that some can be 
eradicated and some merely controlled. David C. Aune also claims that Philo thinks not 
everyone is able to control the passions.
241
 
The variation between passions which can be controlled is interesting in Philo, and might 
give clarity to 4 Maccabees. Philo says that eating and drinking, which are necessary for 
the body, must be approached with the control that reason can provide (Leg. 3.145, 155). 
Such normal physical appetites are merely controlled instead of eradicated; it may be that 
this is the approach which 4 Maccabees takes as well, but there is not enough information 
in the work to assess this. Philo says that the ability to withstand temptation of food laws 
is especially important at banquets. 
In the company of reason, I then become a master instead of a slave: and without 
being subdued myself win a glorious victory of self-denial and temperance; 
opposing and contending against all the appetites which subdue the intemperate. 
(Leg. 3.156) 
The discussion of control of the passions, and the application of a belief in a Platonic 
tripartite soul to this Stoic problem, had featured prominently in Hellenistic philosophy 
for a century before both works. This move in Hellenistic philosophy only seems to have 
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evolved in the figure of Posidonius of Rhodes and his teacher Panataeus to a lesser 
degree.
242
 Stoic ethics were one part of the three part system, divided into physics, ethics 
and logic, a categorization first made by Zeno of Citium and echoed by Chrysippus and 
others (Diog. Laer. 7.39-41). There seems to have been a shift to a focus on ethics in the 
third century B.C.E. Diogenes Laertius records that Aristo of Chios “abolished the topics 
of physics and logic, saying that the former is beyond us and the latter none of our 
concern; ethics is the only topic which concerns us” (Diog. Laer. 7.182-4).
243
 
In opposition to Plato, who thought that moral excellence could be achieved through the 
political structuring of the state, for most Stoics the focus was placed on the individual 
developing moral excellence.
244
 The passions which had to be eliminated were rooted in 
the mind in early Stoicism. Galen records this in several of his works, especially in his 
criticisms of Chrysippus, for not believing that “the emotional element of the soul is 
distinct from the rational” (Fr. 33).
245
 If the passions were a rooted in the psyche, then 
they could be eliminated through proper reasoning.  Where there was disagreement 
among the Stoics, it was not usually disagreement on what this end was, but rather how it 
could best be achieved.
246
 Cicero records that that the Stoics thought that passions, if left 
untreated, led to diseases (Tusc. 4.23). It was also this interest in perfection which led to 
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the Stoic application of therapeutic practice, and Galen records that Chrysippus dedicated 
a book to curing passions (Loc. Aff. 3.1, 8.138K).
247
 It is this model of Stoicism that was 
mistakenly applied to 4 Maccabees by several scholars in the past.
248
 
Posidonius took a different approach to the passions by taking up Platonic philosophy of 
the soul. This adoption of Platonic philosophy by Posidonius has been downplayed in its 
importance to the emergence of Middle Platonism; John Dillon has said that it cannot be 
the “necessary and sufficient condition of the emergence of Middle Platonism.”249 This is 
certainly true, especially since Dillon highlights that Posidonius taught Stoic materialism 
rather than the metaphysical dualism of Middle Platonism. What is clear, however, in 
turning specifically to the Stoic challenge of overcoming the passions, is that the adoption 
of the Platonic ideas of the soul by Posidonius is the necessary but not sufficient cause for 
the view of passions in both Philo and 4 Maccabees (though it may have been transmitted 
to them by others whose writings have now been lost).
250
  
Posidonius… (believes) that emotions were neither judgements nor what 
supervened on judgements, but were caused by the spirited and desiring powers or 
faculties, in this following completely the old account. And time and again in his 
work On Emotions, he asks Chrysippus and his sympathisers what is the cause of 
the excessive impulse. (Fr. 34)
251
 
Early Stoics generally held the cognitive view of passions which was rooted in a one part 
soul, Diogenes Laertius says, therefore emotions were seen as faulty intellectual 
judgments; this meant that only humans had passions since only humans were rational 
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(SVF 3.461).
252
 Consequently, they thought that the basis of passions was faulty 
reasoning.
253
 Galen records that Posidonius drew instead upon Platonic philosophy to 
suggest a three-part soul, the “desiring, the spirited and the rational” (SVF 1.571).254 In 
this citation Galen also claims that Cleanthes believed the same thing. There is 
furthermore good reason to suspect that this move was not limited to Posidonius; Eudorus 
of Alexandria (64 B.C.E.-19 C.E.) is only available in fragments, but also seems to have 
held a similar mix of Platonic and Stoic ideals.
255
 
With the adoption of the tripartite soul into Stoicism, Posidonius could move away from 
passions that were mistaken judgments, arguing rather that they came from the “irrational 
part of the soul.” Dillon says, 
They cannot be utterly eradicated, and their cure must rely on careful training as 
well as purely rational exhortation, which leads to their control rather than their 
rooting out.
256
  
4 Maccabees provides a similar comment on the issue of control rather than eradication.  
But this argument is entirely ridiculous, for it is apparent that reason prevails not 
over its own passions but over those of the body. No one of us can eradicate such 
desire, but reason can provide a way for us not to be enslaved by desire. No one 
of you can eradicate anger from the soul, but reason can help to deal with anger. 
No one of us can eradicate malice, but reason can fight at our side so that we are 
not overcome by malice. For reason is not an uprooter of the passions but their 
antagonist. (4 Macc 3:1-5)  
The same distinction is made in Philo.  
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The irrational portion is sense and the passions which are the offspring of sense, 
unquestionably so if they are not the result of any choice but our own. This helper 
(the mind) then is later born and of course created. (Leg. 2.6)  
This development seems important to both Philo and 4 Maccabees. For the sake of 
discussion, the point of comparison here is that the discussion of whether reason could 
eradicate or merely control the passions was en vogue in the century before Philo and 4 
Maccabees as was the return to Plato to answer this Stoic problem.
257
  The (perhaps 
natural) repercussion to this is that education became the focal point for dealing with the 
passions rather than therapy. 
5.3 Education and the Passions 
 As shown above, Posidonius was opposed the possibility of complete eradication of the 
passions, and he suggested instead that education was the way to defeat them.
258
 Galen 
records that Posidonius thought that children after age fourteen must be educated so that 
reason could come to control the passions, like the rider controlling the team of horses 
(Fr. 31 D).  This education would lead to the emotions being subject to the “commands of 
reason” (Fr. 31 C).
259
 
Both Philo and 4 Maccabees agree that education is the way to make a virtuous person, 
and they both suggest that individuals from the Jewish tradition fulfill these highest levels 
of virtue through their education. For 4 Maccabees there is a clarification of this Stoic 
idea: it is education in the Jewish law that leads to ethical excellence.  
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Reason, then, is the mind preferring, with sound judgment, the life of wisdom.  
Wisdom, in turn, is the knowledge of things divine and human and of the causes 
of these. It amounts, moreover, to training in the law, training by which we learn 
divine matters reverently and human matters advantageously. (4 Macc 1:15-17) 
Therefore, in addition to the categories of reason and the life of wisdom, the clarification 
that it comes from education in the law (ἡ τοῦ νόμου παιδεία) is critical. The education in 
the Torah enables ethical excellence by which these figures achieve virtue and are able to 
withstand when testing comes.  
They grow more robust through common nurture, daily companionship, other 
education and our discipline in divine law. So strong, indeed, is the sympathy of 
brotherly love. Yet the seven brothers felt still greater sympathy toward each 
other. For since they were trained in the same law, diligently practiced the same 
virtues and were brought up together in right living, they loved each other still 
more. (4 Macc 13:22-24)  
This education in the Torah makes it possible, as Marcus P. Adams says, to “master their 
passions, suffer many tortures, and even die ‘for the sake of virtue’” (4 Macc 1:7-8). 
Adams claims, on the basis of his text-critical study, that the ideas of education in the law 
as well as the triumph of reason over the passions are greatly emphasized in Codex 
Alexandrinus in comparison with other manuscripts.
260
 Furthermore, the idea of the 
mother’s nurturing and breastfeeding also becomes a metaphor for passing on divine 
truths.
261
 
As stated previously, Philo believes that it is possible to attain virtue outside of the Torah. 
For those who have already attained virtue, education is superfluous, but for those who 
have not, or for children, education is necessary.  
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There is no need, then, to give injunctions or prohibitions or exhortations to the 
perfect man…the bad man has need of injunction and prohibition, and the child of 
exhortation and teaching. Just as the perfect master of music or letters requires 
none of the directions that apply to those arts, whereas the man who stumbles 
over the subjects of his study does require what we may call laws or rules with 
their injunctions and prohibitions, while one who is now beginning to learn 
requires teaching. (Leg. 1.94) 
Training in the law also is shown to be a way to eliminate the passions.  
Another example of his allegorical interpretation is the law of leprosy, when 
mildew is in the house the stones must be taken out. In the same way, he says, 
when “the handiwork of pleasures and desires and passions… weigh down the 
whole soul… we are to get rid of the principles which cause the infirmity, and 
introduce in their place good healthy principles by means of a training under the 
law. (Det. 16) 
Education in itself seems to become virtuous for Philo and he praises people who learn 
for the sake of learning (Leg. 3.167). It also becomes part of Philo’s system of biblical 
interpretation. In his exegesis of difficult passages, Philo quickly considers that they must 
be for the education of the readers. One of the most interesting examples of this is Philo’s 
interpretation of Genesis 6:7, where God is angry that he made mankind. Philo says that 
this does not actually mean that God is subject to the passion of anger, but it is 
“introduced for the instruction of many” (Deus. 53).  
One of the key factors which affect Philo’s writing is his frustration with the Greek 
historians of his day for forgetting about Moses, despite their education, showing a flaw 
in Greek education (Mos. 1.3). Philo portrays Moses’ education as having more 
multifarious roots than the author of 4 Maccabees does for Eleazar and the seven 
brothers. Philo notes that Moses was educated in Egypt and excelled at every branch of 
Egyptian wisdom, mathematics, and music (Mos. 1.5, 23). In addition to this, Philo says, 
Moses had an excellent Greek education, as well as knowledge of Assyrian literature and 
Chaldean astronomy (Mos. 1.23). Despite this excellent pedagogy, Moses’ preference 
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was for the education in the things of his maternal ancestors (Mos. 1.32), and it was this 
education which led to true ethical superiority.   
This leads to Philo’s designation of Torah as part of an educational process. David C 
Aune says that “the Torah contains the actual utterances of God, which are the ‘royal 
road’ of true and genuine philosophy” (he cites, Post. 101-102).262 For both works 
education becomes a key component in the fight for virtue and, for both, Torah is a part 
of that struggle.   
5.4  The Triumph of the Mind 
If the emphasis on education was rooted in the idea of the tripartite soul and the mind’s 
role in subduing the passions, then the other trend in Hellenistic philosophy which is 
foundational to both Philo and 4 Maccabees is the adoption of the mind as the centre of 
human cognition. This mind (and it is important to note that for both Philo and 4 
Maccabees it is one mind) becomes central to the battle with the passions. The author of 
4 Maccabees writes:  
…he enthroned the mind among the senses as a sacred governor over them all. To 
the mind he gave the law; and one who lives subject to this will rule a kingdom 
that is temperate, just, good, and courageous. (4 Macc 2:22-23) 
The mind is capable of controlling the emotions, but the law is given to prepare the mind 
for this task. So, when the virtues are tested, Eleazar says under torture that it would be 
irrational to betray the ancestral law that he had observed all his life (4 Macc 6:17-18).  
Philo echoes this in attributing the human mind to being the thing which is made in the 
image of God.   
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Let no one represent the likeness as to a bodily form; for neither is God in human 
form, nor is the human body God-like. No, it is in respect of the Mind, the 
sovereign element of the soul that the word “image” is used; for after the pattern 
of a single Mind, even the Mind of the Universe as an archetype, the mind in each 
of those who successfully came into being was moulded. It is in a fashion a god to 
him who carries and enshrines it as an object of reverence; for the human mind 
evidently occupies a position in men precisely answering to that which the great 
Ruler occupies in all the world. (Opif. 69) 
Again the mind occupies the role of governor (both works use the term ἡγεμών) in 
reference to how the mind controls the body. Philo applies this, not only to the dualism of 
the body and soul, but also to the approach to passions. Philo claims that Moses was able 
to control his passions, and he uses the image of the control of a horse several times; in 
this analogy the mind is considered the rider and the horse the passions (Mos. 1.26; Leg. 
2.99). This is identical to the analogy used by Posidonius, who describes the mind as a 
charioteer controlling a team of two horses: desire and anger (Fr. 31 D).
263
 This was also 
an analogy that Plato used (Phaedrus 246a). Therefore when the joyful song of Miriam is 
sung, that “the horse and rider were thrown into the sea,” Philo is clear in his 
interpretation; this refers to the mind’s overthrow of the passions (Leg 2.102-3).  
Galen records Posidonius’ view that the mind is the center of human cognition and moral 
control, as opposed to Chrysippus who, even with advancements in human dissection and 
anatomy by the doctor Herophilus, continued to suggest that the heart was the ruling part 
of the body.
264
 Therefore, once again, the contemporary discussion of how the mind 
overcomes the passions is present in Philo and 4 Maccabees. 
                                                 
263
 Kidd, ed., Posidonius, 3:87. 
264
 Christopher Gill, “Galen and the Stoics: Mortal Enemies or Blood Brothers?” Phronesis 52 no.1 
(Anniversary Papers: The Southern Association for Ancient Philosophy at 50; 2007): 88-120.  
101 
 
5.5 The Struggle for Virtue 
Controlling the passions is no simple task and becomes individual’s battle against 
themselves. Posidonius thought that vice grew from the seed of evil which resided inside 
of the human being rather than coming in from the outside world and corrupting the 
individual; left to run rampant it would corrupt, but if brought under subjection its growth 
would cease (Fr. 35 C).
265
 The presence of a nature within that must be overcome is also 
central to both works. In 4 Maccabees the root of evil behaviour is within the human 
being, as Posidonius taught, and the law teaches the individual to act contrary to their 
nature. 
Thus, as soon as one adopts a way of life in accordance with the law, even though 
a lover of money, one is forced to act contrary to natural ways and to lend without 
interest to the needy and to cancel the debt when the seventh year arrives. If one is 
greedy, one is ruled by the law through reason so that one neither gleans the 
harvest nor gathers the last grapes from the vineyard. (4 Macc 2:8-9) 
 This necessity of acting contrary to one’s nature is also prominent in Philo. At every step 
in the fulfillment of virtue the body interferes with the enactment of that virtue; Philo 
says that to have a physical body is to struggle with the passions (Leg 1.103). Therefore 
Philo accepts the traditional Stoic view of passion as “immoderate and excessive 
impulse.”266 Both pleasure and pain are the same passion, Philo says, because all passions 
are rooted in pleasure, even pain is the lack of pleasure (Leg. 3.113). This is similar to 
what the author of 4 Maccabees says: “of the passions, the two most comprehensive types 
are pleasure and pain, and each of these pertains by nature both to the body and to the 
soul” (4 Macc 1:20). 
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Both works frame the struggle with passions using athletic imagery. It is a match for a 
prize which, Philo says, is a crown “such as no assembly of men can confer” (Leg. 
2:108).
267
 The author of 4 Maccabees spends considerable time framing the struggle 
between the martyrs and the king in athletic terms (4 Macc 17:11-16).
268
 This same 
struggle is shown throughout Philo’s works, and is especially prominent in his allegorical 
interpretations. It is shown in the life of Jacob, says Philo, who struggled with the 
passions both over his birthright and the blessing of his father; the image of Jacob 
wrestling with God is analogous to how we are to wrestle with the passions (Leg. 3.190).  
5.6 Freedom and Morality 
The final issue of Hellenistic philosophy which is related to the struggle with the passions 
for both works is the problem of moral culpability. In 4 Maccabees this is related to the 
question of whether the martyrs are guilty if they are forced to eat pork. The king says to 
Eleazar: “bear in mind that, if indeed there is some power overseeing this religion of 
yours, it will excuse you for any transgression committed under duress” (4 Macc 5:13). 
The king again encourages the seven brothers that if they transgress the law under 
compulsion they will be forgiven, and at one point the narrator speculates that they might 
have used compulsion as a reasonable excuse to avoid torture, but they did not (8:14, 22, 
24). Eleazar tells the king: “do not consider any compulsion more powerful than our 
ready obedience to the law” (5:16).  
                                                 
267
 deSilva, 4 Maccabees, 66.  
268
 Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem, 208; Pfitzner, Paul and the Agon Motif, 59. 
103 
 
Freedom was a central feature for Philo as well and, like 4 Maccabees, it seems the 
primary reason for freedom was related to the question of moral accountability. 
For that is the only quality in us which the Father, who created us, thought 
deserving of freedom; and, unloosing the bonds of necessity, he let it go 
unrestrained, bestowing on it that most admirable gift and most connected with 
himself, the power, namely, of spontaneous will, as far as he was able to receive it 
. . . But man, who has had bestowed on him a voluntary and self-impelling 
intellect, and who for the most part puts forth his energies in accordance with 
deliberate purpose, very properly receives blame for the offences which he 
designedly commits, and praise for the good actions which he intentionally 
performs… But the soul of man, being the only one which has received from God 
the power of voluntary motion, and which in this respect has been made to 
resemble God, and being as far as possible emancipated from the authority of that 
grievous and severe mistress, necessity, may rightly be visited with reproach if 
she does not pay due honor to the being who has emancipated her. And therefore, 
in such a case, she will most deservedly suffer the implacable punishment 
denounced against slavish and ungrateful minds. (Deus. 47-48)   
In Philo there is a value placed on this freedom because of the moral responsibility which 
accompanies it.  
So, both works also show the difficulty that the Stoics were having between holding the 
idea of fate and desiring to give individuals moral responsibility; this is a problem which 
has recently been identified by several scholars. Josiah Gould has identified in 
Chrysippus’ philosophy the disjointedness between the fatalism based on principles of 
motion and the desire to speak to morality, which he says remained an unsolved 
problem.
269
 Suzanne Bobzien has also spoken to this problem between moral 
responsibility and fate which she says seems to have been an interest of the Stoics, but 
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most of the discussion of which is unfortunately lost.
270
 So, here Philo and 4 Maccabees 
both speak to the problem. The author of 4 Maccabees said that they could have used this 
as an excuse to eat pork, but they did not. This seems to either heighten the martyr’s 
virtue or downplay the excusability of action done under compulsion. Philo uses the 
principles of motion to explain the God has given the individual freedom of action.  
This chapter has very briefly outlined some of the influences from Hellenism which 
define issues of relationship between Judaism and Hellenism for Philo and 4 Maccabees. 
Of course, this is far from an exhaustive discussion of the Stoic and Platonic influences 
present in the works, and it is impossible to do justice to each of these points here, but it 
still shows the debt which both authors show to Hellenistic philosophy. The extent to 
which they are committed to these discussions, and the nuances which they represent, 
show that they cannot be considered simply using Hellenism to the service of Judaism, 
but are committed to both. They have a stake, as it were, in the ongoing discussions of 
Hellenistic philosophy. 
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6 Conclusions 
There are several conclusions which can be drawn from this comparison. First, it seems 
that interrelationship between Hellenism and Judaism in Philo and 4 Maccabees is not 
negotiated in wide communities or even locally, but the individual engages with the 
discussions of the day and formulates their own conclusions. Therefore any boundary 
between Judaism and Hellenism must be individualistic because of the necessity for 
subjective interpretation of the ideas of a community. The disparity of the works’ 
appropriations of similar cultural language and frameworks might, in fact, show 
diverging hermeneutic communities, but all that can be said for certain is that these 
authors have different views. This shows, as Barth says, that cultural identity must be 
understood through the “experiences through which it is formed,” and in this case the 
interaction of Jews with Hellenization takes on multifarious forms.
271
  
Peering beneath the veneers of communities, religion, and philosophy, there appear two 
individuals trying to make sense of their world, beyond questions of a struggle between 
Judaism and Hellenism or authorial fidelity. Scholars who have attempted to show where 
these authors’ loyalties lay have overlooked the complicated process of identity 
negotiation. Dawson’s work shows the shortcoming of this type of study. He says that 
Philo sees Greek culture as “deficient Judaism” but Judaism could just as easily be seen 
as “incomplete” without Greek philosophy to elucidate the true meanings of Torah.
272
 
The resources of culture rather complement one another in the author’s attempts to 
understand the world. This presents the ultimate difficulty to historians who would 
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analyze the fidelity of these authors; they must at some point step into the circular 
relationship between Judaism and Hellenism.   
As Philo and 4 Maccabees are members of various communities, and those communities 
on various levels, it is clear that as individuals their boundaries show a rich dialogue with 
many elements of the culture around them. On the level of methodology, this dialectic 
again presents a challenge to the study of boundaries. Cohen identifies a problem which 
faces anthropology and subsequently history; it is that anthropologists see ethnic 
boundaries as being between cultures rather than between minds.
273
 So, in studying 
Hellenization and Jewishness in Philo and 4 Maccabees, it becomes clear that both works 
envision a different relationship between Jews and Greek thought. However, what is 
perhaps most interesting are the elements of Hellenization which are simply taken for 
granted by both Philo and 4 Maccabees. Neither asks if Jews should be attempting to 
acquire virtue or defeat the passions, but both authors simply assume this.  
So, both authors have either consciously or unconsciously adopted these Hellenistic 
goals. Therefore, as interpreters of their world, Philo and the author of 4 Maccabees 
naturally and perhaps unintentionally use the cultural language and resources which are 
available to them to make sense of their own patriotism and ethnicity. The anthropologist 
Clifford Geertz famously said,  
Man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun. I take 
culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental 
science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning.
274
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Cohen unpacks this definition by Geertz.   
There are three interrelated and powerful principles contained within Geertz’s 
precise and eloquent formulation. The first is that culture (“webs of significance”) 
is created and continually recreated by people through their social interaction, 
rather than imposed upon them as a Durkheimian body of social fact or as Marxist 
superstructure. Secondly, being continuously in process, culture has neither 
deterministic power nor objectively identifiable referents (“law”). Third, it is 
manifest, rather, in the capacity with which it endows people to perceive meaning 
in, or to attach meaning to social behavior.
275
 
Therefore, Philo and 4 Maccabees create and recreate both Jewishness and Hellenization. 
Philo seems to undermine boundaries and 4 Maccabees seems to enhance them, but they 
both either knowingly or unknowingly create a concept of culture through the dialectic 
between Judaism and Hellenism. Secondly, the “identifiable referent” which has been 
considered to be the Torah comes with questionable and ambiguous meaning, and in both 
works the words and content of the law is used to cross the boundaries between Judaism 
and Hellenism; both approaches to the Torah highlight extreme subjectivity with which 
they interpret it. Thirdly, the focus on ethical behavior provides a way to understand 
meaning between the cultures of which they are a part.  
Consequently, both Philo and 4 Maccabees as individuals become subjects of 
Hellenization and in their search for understanding of their world they inevitably dialogue 
with it (perhaps unknowingly). Therefore the understanding of Hellenization of these two 
works cannot speak of Hellenization on the communal level, but rather on the level of the 
self. So, reclamation of the self in the study Hellenization would be a valuable endeavor. 
As Anthony Cohen has suggested:  
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The self is [not] autonomous—such a claim would be facile. Selves are acted 
upon: they are social. They are also cultural. But the self is not passive as a 
subject of society and of culture; it has agency, is active, proactive and creative. 
Constituted by a society and made competent by culture, individuals make their 
worlds through their acts of perception and interpretation.
276
 
This methodology, applied to these works, again enables a move beyond discussing 
syncretism and author loyalties to seeing the unique ways that these individuals formulate 
their identity.  
The autonomy of the self in the interaction with Hellenism is highlighted in these works 
in the various ways that Philo and the author of 4 Maccabees respond to the same issues. 
For example, the way that they approach the Stoic idea of harmony with nature in one 
sense shows Philo’s natural law leanings and 4 Maccabees’ perspective that Judaism and 
Hellenism are at odds, but ultimately shows that both authors could come to various 
conclusions by interacting with the Stoics’ linking of “nature” and “God.”277   
Therefore Philo discusses how observing the law creates harmony with nature. This idea 
was conspicuous in the Stoics, whose idea of harmony with nature was integrally bonded 
to their idea of natural law.  
Zeno represented the end as: ‘living in agreement’. This is living in accordance 
with one concordant reason, since those who live in conflict are unhappy. His 
successors expressed this in a more expanded form, ‘living in agreement with 
nature’, since they took Zeno’s statement to be an incomplete predicate. (Stobaeus 
2.75,11-76,8)
278
 
Diogenes Laertius furthermore quotes Chrysippus, who says: 
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Living in agreement with nature comes to be the end, which is in accordance with 
the nature of oneself and that of the whole, engaging in no activity wont to be 
forbidden by the universal law. (Chrysippus De finibus, 7.87-9)
279
  
Cicero records that the Stoics “have perceived the final good to be agreement with nature 
and living consistently with nature . . .” (Tusc. 5.81-2), and he quotes Cato who says that 
this final good is “. . . selecting those (things) in accordance with nature and rejecting 
those contrary to nature, that is—a life in agreement and consistent with nature” (Fin. 
3.31).
280
 
Philo adopts the idea that living according to the law promotes harmony with nature 
which strengthens the argument for his natural law inclinations and the connection to the 
Stoic idea of natural law.
281
 For Philo, obedience to the law of God does not only provide 
heavenly benefit but also fulfills the Stoic vision of alignment with nature. He sees living 
by the law as essentially living in harmony with the law of the universe and says that 
Moses accepted: 
. . . that the world is in harmony with the law and the law with the world, and that 
the man who observes the law is constituted thereby a loyal citizen of the world, 
regulating his doings by the purpose and will of nature, in accordance with which 
the entire world itself also is administered. (Opif. 3) 
Following the laws therefore creates a type of harmony in the individual, because the 
arrangement of one’s life matches the arrangement of the universe and, in the same way, 
the individual’s actions will match their words (Mos. 2.48). The laws on an individual 
level, says Philo, are meant to work for “harmony of the universe” and they are “in 
agreement with the principles of eternal nature” (Mos. 2.52).” Therefore Philo shows the 
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purpose of the individual laws given by Moses, and he presents this as the reason why 
people should be attracted to the observance of the law (Mos. 2.51).
282
 
The approach to nature in 4 Maccabees is almost completely opposite to that of Philo, 
shown in the Rededuelle of the text in which the perceived threats of the author of 4 
Maccabees are exposed, the speech of the king. Contrary to Philo’s view that harmony 
with nature arises from following the law, it is this same position which is argued for by 
the enemy king in 4 Maccabees. He says that by avoiding pork the Hebrews are spurning 
the gifts of nature:  
Why should you abhor eating the very excellent meat of this animal when nature 
has provided it? For it is senseless not to enjoy delicious things that are not 
shameful and not right to decline the gifts of nature. (4 Macc 5:8-9)  
The king’s expression here, “the gifts of nature,” can be cautiously advanced as offering 
something similar to both the Stoics’ and Philo’s idea of “harmony with nature.” His 
ignorance is exposed, however, several lines later in Eleazar’s response, when he says 
that God sympathizes with human nature, which is the reason why he has given things to 
eat that will benefit humankind and things to avoid which will harm the soul/life (4 Macc 
5:25-26).  
The above example also shows the problem which confronts historians. Any concept of 
ethnic or community boundaries falls short of understanding discrepancies in the 
individual’s attempt to understand their world. Therefore, the above discrepancy may be 
the result of some specific teaching behind both works, but it is more likely 
representative of random variations in their synthesis. Therefore, discrepancies in the 
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boundaries of any potential group show the necessity of assessing identity on the level of 
individual experience.
283
 This justifies Barclay’s idea of the “negotiation” of identity, but 
specific negotiations can only be assessed on an individual and not a communal level.
284
 
Philo adopts the Stoic harmony with nature as complementary to Jewish teaching, while 
the author of 4 Maccabees sees it either as a threat, or as a mistaken understanding which 
needs correction.  This further undermines anything that could be categorized as Judaism 
or Hellenism and the authors’ faithfulness to either of these, since faithfulness to one or 
the other assumes that it would be easy to identify either one, which it is not. This has 
been Cohen’s critique of the way in which boundaries are studied.  
Rather than questioning their existence, or questioning the extent to which they 
might reasonably be generalized (whose boundaries are they?), they have been 
concerned almost exclusively with the ways in which boundaries are marked.
285
  
There are two ongoing challenges which this study has not been able to overcome, indeed 
which no work may ever. The first is the incredible complexity of these works, both in 
the philosophical prowess of Philo and 4 Maccabees and in their paradigmatic attention 
to detail, which means that a study like this must always generalize and oversimplify. The 
second issue is that, as the literature review has shown, many modern religious historians 
are still influenced by ideas of orthodoxy and heterodoxy. Both of these are artificial 
categories created by historians and there is a need to move beyond them. Moreover, 
categorization is further hindered even by the attempts to isolate a “religious” 
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manifestation in the ancient world.
286
 Were Philo and the author of 4 Maccabees Jews 
who practiced philosophy, or philosophers who also happened to be Jews? If they were 
both how is it possible to distinguish between Philo and 4 Maccabees as Jews and as 
philosophers?  
The failure to adequately answer this question has resulted, for the study of Jewish 
history in particular, in what Cohen calls an “ethnographic preoccupation.”287 As a side 
note, it also seems that the classification of 4 Maccabees as a religious text has caused 
Classics scholars to overlook it. Furthermore, Philo has been well studied under the 
category of Middle Platonism, but his contributions and recordings of the murky world of 
Middle Stoicism have also been frequently overlooked. Ultimately, as Renehan argues, 
even the categories of Middle Stoicism and Middle Platonism are modern constructs and 
not lived realities.
288
 
In regards to Torah, for Philo and 4 Maccabees its usefulness seems to be in presenting 
new possibilities for understanding of the Hellenistic world, and a better method by 
which to achieve Hellenistic virtue. The Torah as a symbol therefore becomes the thing 
which transcends cultures in its applicability, which is to both Hellenism and Judaism. 
Philo and the author of 4 Maccabees show Cohen’s description of a symbol to be true. He 
compares symbol to language, saying that, just as language does not give meaning but a 
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way to make meaning, so symbol creates the possibility of meaning.
289
 For Philo, 
allegory is not meant to obscure boundaries but rather to clarify the universal reality 
behind the text. For 4 Maccabees, ancestral law is a way of claiming universal legitimacy 
for the Torah, showing that its applicability was to all Hellenistic cultures, and not only 
Jews. Therefore the author could explain that Antiochus used the lessons that he learned 
from dealing with the Jews in his successful attack on Egypt (4 Macc 17:23-24). 
Finally, the idea of a struggle with Hellenism must be redefined as the individual’s 
struggle for universal meaning, for neither Philo nor 4 Maccabees is this meaning 
exclusivist. Therefore, even the highlighting of difference is not the indicator of two 
mutually exclusive worldviews. Ultimately, looking for cultural difference or a struggle 
between Judaism and Hellenism by analysts of religious history has self-fulfilling 
consequences. Therefore, when Himmelfarb says that Philo (and Josephus) adapted 
“Greek ideas and values in the service of a new understanding of Jewish tradition, which 
is, none the less, distinctively Jewish,” this does not carry with it an understanding of  
what it means to be “distinctively Jewish” or what it would take to be “distinctively 
Hellenistic.”290 The problem of historical categorization is clear. It seems that the 
categories which dictate views of these works such as Judaism and Hellenism must again 
be re-evaluated, not only as over-simplistic, but as creating the dichotomies which the 
historian seeks to find.
291
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